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Removal Reform: A Solution for Federal Question 
Jurisdiction, Forum Shopping, and Duplicative State-
Federal Litigation  
MARTHA A. FIELD* 
Federal court procedural, especially jurisdictional ones, need to be governed by 
clear, effective, and fair rules. Yet twentieth century doctrines and reforms, even 
when made in the name of pragmatism, have produced decidedly unpragmatic 
results: a vague and disputed doctrine of federal question jurisdiction that excludes 
from federal court many cases where federal law controls the outcome, rules that 
facilitate forum shopping by plaintiffs and make it impossible to predict in advance 
what law will apply to decide one’s case, and the stunning waste of a system in 
which the exact same issues are simultaneously litigated in state and federal courts 
as part of a “race to judgment.” The status quo is, quite simply, broken. 
This Article contends that we can ameliorate these concerns by permitting 
removal to federal court whenever the parties are diverse and whenever the 
defendant’s answer or plaintiff’s reply shows that a case arises under federal law—
rather than artificially limiting our vision to the plaintiff’s well-pleaded complaint. 
Though modest, these reforms could serve as a tonic to many of the status quo’s 
most striking irrationalities: the criteria for federal question jurisdiction would be 
expanded to cover many currently excluded cases that turn on federal law, 
plaintiffs would lose opportunities to forum shop by pinning unwilling defendants 
in state courts, and the systemic waste of duplicative and concurrent state-federal 
litigation could be largely eliminated. By broadly addressing these deeply-rooted 
problems, this Article aims at improving the clarity, rationality, and essential 
fairness of the rules that govern our federal courts. 
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INTRODUCTION 
This Article discusses changing certain aspects of U.S. federal rules permitting 
the removal to federal court of cases commenced in a state court: one aspect that 
concerns federal question jurisdiction and one that concerns primarily diversity 
litigation. Current rules allow plaintiffs to select both where to sue and whether to 
proceed in state or federal court in a range of cases that qualify either for the 
general federal question jurisdiction, under 28 U.S.C. § 1331, or the federal 
diversity jurisdiction, under 28 U.S.C. § 1332.1 Today’s removal procedures 
(embodied in 28 U.S.C. § 1441) sometimes, but not always (see 28 U.S.C. § 
1441(b)), allow defendants to remove a case brought in state court when a plaintiff 
could have chosen a federal forum but selected state court instead.2 
In federal question cases, both the determination whether the plaintiff can 
choose federal jurisdiction and the determination whether the defendant(s) can 
remove if the plaintiff has selected state court, are made from reading solely the 
complaint the plaintiff has filed to initiate the litigation. In order for federal 
question jurisdiction to be available, that complaint must disclose (and traditional 
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 1. Section 1332 gives the district courts jurisdiction “of all civil actions where the 
matter in controversy exceeds the sum or value of $75,000 . . . and is between . . . citizens of 
different states.” 28 U.S.C. § 1322(a) (2006). Section 1331 gives district courts jurisdiction 
“of all civil actions arising under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States.” 28 
U.S.C. § 1331 (2006). 
 2. Section 1441(a) states the general rule for removal: 
 Except as otherwise expressly provided by Act of Congress, any civil action 
brought in a State court of which the district courts of the United States have 
original jurisdiction, may be removed by the defendant or the defendants, to the 
district court of the United States for the district and division embracing the 
place where such action is pending. 
28 U.S.C. § 1441(a) (2006). Section 1441(b) provides for one express exception: 
 Any civil action of which the district courts have original jurisdiction 
founded on a claim or right arising under the Constitution, treaties or laws of 
the United States shall be removable without regard to the citizenship or 
residence of the parties. Any other such action shall be removable only if none 
of the parties in interest properly joined and served as defendants is a citizen of 
the State in which such action is brought. 
28 U.S.C. § 1441(b) (2006). That is, if any defendant is sued in his or her home state, then a 
federal court located therein may not obtain diversity jurisdiction in such action. 
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rules of pleading must require it to disclose) that the case “arises under” federal 
law, as that phrase has been defined by the Supreme Court. This rule is now known 
as the “well-pleaded complaint rule”—and it is central to federal question 
jurisdiction. 
The change I will suggest makes the defendant’s answer and the plaintiff’s reply 
also relevant to whether a case “arises under federal law” at the stage of removal. 
One effect is to lessen the plaintiff’s opportunity to control the federal-state choice 
and sometimes even the choice of what law will apply, with his initial choice of 
court and his control of the initial pleadings.3 Another effect is to broaden federal 
question jurisdiction by admitting more cases in which federal law controls the 
outcome. In diversity litigation, the proposed change dispenses with the long-
existing exception from removal of the defendant who is sued in her home state. If 
the parties to a litigation are from different states, the plaintiff could no longer sue 
in a way that pins the defendant(s) into state court, as he can now, by choosing to 
sue in her home state. The aim of the changes is to allow defendants to remove to 
federal court, within either the diversity or the federal question jurisdictions, 
whenever the plaintiff could have chosen federal court but has selected state court 
instead. Cases that qualify for federal jurisdiction thus would take place in state 
court only with the concurrence of both parties. 
The proposals are not entirely new. Over the past half century, others, most 
notably the American Law Institute (ALI), have suggested some similar changes, or 
changes that would have similar effects.4 Although the ALI report captured a 
certain amount of attention in Congress, it did not result in statutes or reform.5 I 
will review, albeit quickly, some conventional reasons for favoring identical and 
equal opportunities for federal jurisdiction by both parties, in both federal question 
and diversity contexts, as well as the reasons against doing so. 
But the main point of this Article goes beyond evaluation of current removal 
rules in their own right. Whatever one thinks of the proposed rules in terms of their 
direct consequences, my principal point is the enormous effect the change in 
                                                                                                                 
 
 3. Plaintiffs’ choices are limited anyway by rules of pleading, directing what may and 
may not appear in the complaint. In some cases, however, plaintiffs can choose whether to 
sue on a state or federal cause of action, without thereby affecting the substance of the case. 
See infra text accompanying notes 207–09. In those situations, current law allows them to 
control the choice of forum. 
 4. See AM. LAW INST., STUDY OF THE DIVISION OF JURISDICTION BETWEEN STATE AND 
FEDERAL COURTS (1969). 
 5. See The Division of Jurisdiction Between State and Federal Courts: Hearings 
Before the Subcomm. on Improvements in Judicial Mach. of the Comm. on the Judiciary, 92d 
Cong. (1971); Margaret Tarkington, Rejecting the Touchstone: Complete Preemption and 
Congressional Intent After Beneficial National Bank v. Anderson, 59 S.C. L. Rev. 225 
(2008). Although “multiple bills have been introduced in Congress to repeal the well-
pleaded complaint rule, at least to the extent that the rule forbids removal on the basis of a 
federal defense . . . Congress has yet to pass such an act.” Tarkington, supra, at 237. The 
ALI proposed one such act which Congress rejected: “[A] major effort was made in 1971, 
based on a study by the American Law Institute . . . to change the judicial code to allow 
removal on the basis of a federal defense.” Id. at 237 n.58 (citing The Division of 
Jurisdiction Between State and Federal Courts: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on 
Improvements in Judicial Mach. of the Comm. on the Judiciary, supra). 
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removal rules could and would have on other, seemingly unrelated federal court 
doctrines. I will discuss three important problem areas in federal court 
jurisprudence that would be sharply affected, indeed radically improved, if both 
parties had the same opportunity to invoke federal jurisdiction in each case. The 
three subject areas to be improved, or even fixed, by removal reform are: 
 
1. The ill-defined and fundamentally irrational criteria for invoking federal 
question jurisdiction; 
 
2. Forum shopping by litigants and would-be litigants aiming to alter the result 
in the particular litigation; and 
 
3. Duplicative, concurrent state and federal litigation between the same parties. 
 
After setting out the proposed changes in the removal statutes, I will discuss 
each of these problem areas in turn, showing how the proposed revisions would be 
helpful. 
I. THE PROPOSED REMOVAL STATUTES 
The statutes granting diversity and federal question jurisdiction (current §§ 1331 
and 1332) could remain the same. The first section of the removal statute, 28 
U.S.C. § 1441(a), would be amended to read: 
 Except as otherwise expressly provided by Act of Congress, any 
civil action brought in a State court of which the district courts of the 
United States have original jurisdiction, as judged either from the 
complaint in the controversy or from the answer or reply submitted at 
the outset of the litigation, may be removed by the defendant or the 
defendants, to the district court of the United States for the district and 
division embracing the place where such action is pending. The plaintiff 
or the plaintiffs also may remove the litigation to that district court on 
the basis of the defendant’s answer or the plaintiff’s reply, submitted at 
the outset of the litigation. For purposes of removal under this chapter, 
the citizenship of parties sued under fictitious names shall be 
disregarded. 
The parts to be added to the current statute are italicized. The use of the term 
“parties,” in the last sentence, substitutes for the existing statute’s reference to 
“defendants.” 
The current subsection (b) of § 1441—denying removal to a defendant in a 
diversity action who is sued in her home state—would be deleted. The rest of the 
provisions in § 1441 would remain, with current (c) becoming (b), (d) becoming 
(c), and so forth. 
II. FEDERAL QUESTION JURISDICTION 
An extraordinary feature of federal question jurisdiction is the long-standing 
difficulty of stating what “arises under” federal law and what does not. Federal 
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question jurisdiction is probably the most important category of federal court 
jurisdiction, yet during most of its existence its contours have been indiscernible. It 
may be possible to state its rules today; indeed, I make an effort at a concise 
statement later in the discussion.6 Even if correct, those rules are very complex, as 
well as being both arbitrary and irrational. (And if my statement is inaccurate, that 
should demonstrate continuing confusion as to what the rules are.) 
Uncertainty in law is not always a vice. In some contexts it can be tolerable and 
even productive. Those contexts do not include jurisdictional rules. Rules that 
involve choosing the correct forum for a lawsuit—or a correct forum—cause 
needless litigation when they do not offer clear guidance. Even clear rules that 
leave discretion to be exercised on some vague basis are disruptive and wasteful, 
especially if that discretion can be invoked at a late stage in the litigation, like 
Supreme Court review. 
The problem is extreme because of our doctrine that jurisdictional flaws can be 
raised at any time in the litigation, during trial or for the first time on appeal. Even 
if the parties overlook the problem, a deciding court can and should address it 
whenever the court notices it. If the court finds no federal jurisdiction and lower 
federal courts have already ruled, even on the merits in prolonged litigation, the 
earlier litigation is void, and the parties must start anew in state court—assuming 
that they are not precluded by a statute of limitations that expired while they were 
still in federal court. The parties and the courts both needlessly expend what may 
be substantial time and resources; the justification, of course, is enforcement of the 
federal jurisdictional limitation. 
Uncertainty about the contours of federal question jurisdiction remains, despite a 
unanimous 2005 Supreme Court decision purporting to resolve confusing 
jurisdictional issues. Indeed, the 2005 decision, Grable & Sons Metal Products v. 
Darue Engineering & Manufacturing,7 builds heavily on and reaffirms an earlier 
unanimous decision, Franchise Tax Board v. Construction Laborers’ Vacation 
Trust,8 decided in 1983. One problem with these cases as clarifiers of the law is that 
each was closely followed by an arguably contradictory subsequent case; Merrell 
Dow Pharmaceuticals v. Thompson9 in the case of Franchise Tax, and Empire 
Healthchoice Assurance v. McVeigh10 in the case of Grable. Those follow-up 
decisions were produced by divided courts, with the principal opinions seemingly 
reflecting a view of federal question jurisdiction contrary to that of their unanimous 
predecessor. 
Even if the murky holdings of the follow-up cases are removed from 
consideration, however, Franchise Tax and Grable themselves do little to settle 
some central problems concerning the current scope of federal jurisdiction. They 
may have given us a stronger sense of what the rules are, but if so, those rules 
suggest neither a rational nor an easily workable structure for federal question 
jurisdiction. I will discuss these more modern cases in detail, after setting out the 
background and the problem(s) to be confronted. 
                                                                                                                 
 
 6. See infra text accompanying Part II.D. 
 7. 545 U.S. 308 (2005). 
 8. 463 U.S. 1 (1983). 
 9. 478 U.S. 804 (1986). 
 10. 547 U.S. 677 (2006). 
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A. The 100-Year-Old Problem 
For the past 100 years, the salient ambiguity in federal question jurisdiction has 
been whether a matter qualifies for jurisdiction because it “turns on” issues of 
federal law. Another way to state the issue is to ask whether a federal cause of 
action is the sole basis for federal question jurisdiction.11 
It was not until 1875 that general federal question jurisdiction was established.12 
It is much newer than the diversity jurisdiction, which has been with us from the 
outset.13 Early federal question cases, such as Hans v. Louisiana14 and Ex parte 
Young,15 often describe the statute as placing within the jurisdiction cases that “turn 
on federal law.” That seems a functional and sensible interpretation of “arising 
under” jurisdiction, because enabling greater uniformity and expertise in the 
decision of federal issues are important reasons for federal question jurisdiction.16 
The “turns on” approach was also a workable one during the early years of federal 
question jurisdiction.17 Indeed, under the 1875 statute, removal was available to 
both parties;18 courts considered all pleadings relevant, not simply the complaint. 
                                                                                                                 
 
 11. Arguably a third category of federal question jurisdiction exists, allowing removal 
when the plaintiff’s cause of action is “clearly preempted” by federal law. That category has 
developed since 1968, when the Supreme Court decided Avco Corp. v. Aero Lodge No. 735, 
International Association of Machinists & Aerospace Workers, 390 U.S. 557 (1968). The 
contours of the preemption category are not yet delineated; they are still developing. By 
suggesting the possibility of federal cause of action as the sole test for federal question 
jurisdiction under § 1331, I am not discounting this preemption category. Rather, I consider 
it a subset of the federal cause of action test, because the theory behind it is that the plaintiff 
is required to bring a particular, exclusive federal action if he is to pursue the litigation. 
 12. It also existed briefly from 1801 until 1802. See Act of Feb. 13, 1801, § 11, 2 Stat. 
89, 92, repealed by Act of Mar. 8, 1802, § 1, 2 Stat. 132, 132. The circumstances are more 
fully treated in FELIX FRANKFURTER & JAMES M. LANDIS, THE BUSINESS OF THE SUPREME 
COURT 23–32 (1928). 
 13. Act of September 24, 1789, ch. 20, 1 Stat. 73. 
 14. 134 U.S. 1 (1890). 
 15. 209 U.S. 123 (1908). 
 16. See Paul J. Mishkin, The Federal “Question” in the District Courts, 53 COLUM. L. 
REV. 157, 158–59 (1953); see also Martin v. Hunter’s Lessee, 14 U.S. 304, 347–48 (1816) 
(“That motive is the importance, and even necessity of uniformity of decisions throughout 
the whole United States, upon all subjects within the purview of the constitution. Judges of 
equal learning and integrity, in different states, might differently interpret a statute, or a 
treaty of the United States, or even the constitution itself: If there were no revising authority 
to control these jarring and discordant judgments, and harmonize them into uniformity, the 
laws, the treaties, and the constitution of the United States would be different in different 
states, and might, perhaps, never have precisely the same construction, obligation, or 
efficacy, in any two states.”). 
 17. See Ames v. Kansas ex rel. Johnston, 111 U.S. 449 (1884) (allowing federal 
question jurisdiction on the basis of federal issues central to the case but not necessarily in 
the plaintiff’s complaint, let alone his well-pleaded complaint); R.R. Co. v. Mississippi, 102 
U.S. 135, 140–41 (1880) (same); Tennessee v. Davis, 100 U.S. 257, 264 (1879) (same). 
 18. Act of March 3, 1875, ch. 137, § 2, 18 Stat. 470, 470–71 (“That any suit of a civil 
nature, at law or equity . . . brought in any State court . . . and arising under the Constitution 
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In the late 1880s, the Court began to impose a well-pleaded complaint rule as a 
way to limit the plaintiff’s initial pleading.19 Until then, a plaintiff could obtain 
jurisdiction by claiming a case would be federal because of answers and issues he 
anticipated the defendant would raise.20 The plaintiff could obtain federal 
jurisdiction on this basis even when the defendant did not plead in her answer the 
federal argument the plaintiff attributed to her, or any other federal argument.21 
In 1887, Congress amended the removal statute to permit removal by defendants 
but not by plaintiffs.22 Unable to remove, plaintiffs seeking federal jurisdiction had 
added reason to anticipate federal arguments by defendants. But courts came to 
limit such anticipatory pleading; eventually they denied jurisdiction not only when 
plaintiffs had erroneously anticipated defenses but also when defendants did in fact 
raise the anticipated defense.23 
 The big step in extension of the well-pleaded complaint rule came when some 
judges started applying the rule to defendants on removal as well as to plaintiffs’ 
initial pleadings.24 Instead of interpreting the 1887 amendment simply to limit 
removal to defendants, this interpretation also limited defendants’ ability to 
remove. Although it seems illogical, courts began to prevent removal even by 
defendants if the basis for federal jurisdiction did not appear in the plaintiff’s well-
pleaded complaint. At least by 1908, this broad application of the well-pleaded 
complaint rule to defendants as well as plaintiffs became the accepted standard for 
federal question jurisdiction, and it has been deemed settled precedent ever since. 
The case that definitively established this broad application of the well-pleaded 
complaint rule is Louisville & Nashville Railroad Co. v. Mottley.25 The Mottley 
plaintiffs sued in federal court to complain of the railroad not honoring their 
lifetime passes, which they had obtained in a settlement against the railroad.26 Their 
complaint correctly revealed that the railroad would rely on a federal statute that 
forbid it from honoring the passes. The controlling issues were whether the statute 
applied retroactively, and if so, whether that federal statute was constitutional.27 By 
the time the case got to the Supreme Court, lower federal courts had passed on the 
merits, holding for the Mottleys, but the Supreme Court held that federal courts 
                                                                                                                 
or law of the United States . . . either party may remove said suit into the circuit court of the 
United States for the proper district.”). 
 19. Third St. & Suburban Ry. v. Lewis, 173 U.S. 457, 460 (1899); Tennessee v. Union 
& Planters’ Bank, 152 U.S. 454 (1894). 
 20. See Robinson v. Anderson, 121 U.S. 522, 524 (1887) (decided under the March 3, 
1875 statute (§ 5, 18 Stat. 470)). 
 21. See Metcalf v. City of Watertown, 128 U.S. 586 (1888). 
 22. Act of March 3, 1887, ch. 373, § 2, 24 Stat. 552, 553 (“That any suit of a civil nature 
at law or in equity . . . of which the circuit courts of the United States are given original 
jurisdiction by the preceding section, which may now be pending, or which may hereafter be 
brought, in any State court, may be removed by the defendant or defendants therein to the 
circuit court of the United States . . . .”). 
 23. See City of Shreveport v. Cole, 129 U.S. 36 (1889). 
 24. See Chappell v. Waterworth, 155 U.S.102, 107–08 (1894) (removal); Tennessee v. 
Union & Planters’ Bank, 152 U.S. 454 (1894). 
 25. 211 U.S. 149 (1908). 
 26. See id. at 150–51. 
 27. See id. at 151–52. 
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never had original jurisdiction of the controversy.28 The reason: the Mottleys’ 
allegation that federal law would govern, although correct, was not required to 
appear in their well-pleaded complaint. They had been required to allege only that 
they had been denied their contractual (state-created) right to ride. It was the 
defendant’s appropriate pleading that would rely on the federal statute and the 
Mottleys’ reply that would allege unconstitutionality. Therefore, although the case 
undoubtedly turned on federal issues, those issues would not arise on a properly 
pleaded complaint. Accordingly, all prior litigation was void, and the Mottleys 
were sent to state court to pursue their grievance. If the case turned on federal law 
after the state proceedings were completed (as it clearly would), then the Supreme 
Court could review the federal issues.29 
Mottley dramatically illustrates how application of the well-pleaded complaint 
rule keeps out of federal courts cases that turn on federal law. It also shows the 
wastefulness, both for courts and for parties, of prolonging issues about the proper 
court in which to litigate. 
After Mottley had made clear that courts could look only to the well-pleaded 
complaint to establish either original or removal jurisdiction, the question 
remained, “What were courts to look for?” In 1916, Justice Holmes answered this 
question, refining Mottley’s rule by proclaiming that only the cause of action 
(which would appear on the face of any well-pleaded complaint) determines 
jurisdiction; a federal cause of action was essential for federal question 
jurisdiction.30 Others disagreed, believing that other federal elements apparent from 
an appropriate complaint could also support jurisdiction. Not any nor every federal 
element was sufficient. A remote federal right or issue unlikely to have any effect 
in the case could not sustain jurisdiction, even if it was required to appear on the 
complaint. Congress could explicitly give jurisdiction of such a controversy under a 
specific grant of federal jurisdiction, but such jurisdiction did not “arise” under the 
general federal question statute.31 But if the complaint showed (and was required to 
show) that the case would turn on federal law, the traditional and trusted test for 
federal jurisdiction would admit the controversy to the federal courts. 
The disagreement came to a head in Smith v. Kansas City Trust,32 in which the 
Court upheld “turns on” jurisdiction over Justice Holmes’s insistence in dissent that 
a federal cause of action was required.33 But Smith did not forsake the well-pleaded 
                                                                                                                 
 
 28. See id. at 152. 
 29. The Mottleys’ case again came to the Supreme Court, in Louisville & Nashville R.R. 
v. Mottley, 219 U.S. 467 (1911). 
 30. Am. Well Works Co. v. Layne & Bowler Co., 241 U.S. 257, 260 (1916) (“A suit 
arises under the law that creates the cause of action.”). Moreover, unlike today, the volume 
of litigation was such that the Supreme Court could be expected to review a large percentage 
of the meritorious cases turning on federal issues that were wrongly decided. Therefore, 
there was more opportunity for federal input in a case that did not receive federal jurisdiction 
than there is today, when only a small number of cases litigated in state courts make it 
beyond their state’s supreme court. 
 31. See Osborn v. Bank of the United States, 22 U.S. 738 (1824) (discussing the 
meaning of “arising under” as used in the Constitution). 
 32. 255 U.S. 180 (1921). 
 33. See id. at 214–15 (1921) (Holmes, J., dissenting) (“But it seems to me that a suit 
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complaint rule. Smith was the rare case in which the pleading rules allowed—
indeed required—that the plaintiff disclose the nature of the controversy. In that 
pleading, the plaintiff had shown a potentially dispositive federal issue. Smith, 
therefore, satisfied both the well-pleaded complaint rule and the “turns on federal 
law” test.34 That rarity occurred partly because state pleading rules were still 
applicable and the plaintiff’s pleading seemed consistent with Minnesota 
requirements for shareholder derivative actions. Since 1934, the Rules Enabling 
Act has directed federal courts to use federal procedures in actions brought in 
federal court.35 
Given the well-pleaded complaint rule, Holmes’s choice of federal cause of 
action as the element that would define federal question jurisdiction seems most 
sensible. The cause of action will always appropriately appear on the face of the 
complaint. Therefore, if Holmes’s cause of action test were the only basis for 
federal question jurisdiction, the well-pleaded complaint rule would be superfluous 
because it would always be satisfied. The Smith position that a pivotal federal 
question could also confer jurisdiction if it appeared on the face of the well-pleaded 
complaint was plausible also. Indeed it seems consistently to have been “the law,” 
and there are important reasons for allowing cases that will actually turn on federal 
law to have access to federal courts. But the problem is that the category is almost 
an empty one. 
The reason that the well-pleaded complaint rule so undercuts “turns on” 
jurisdiction is that at the point in a case when the complaint is filed, it is usually not 
possible to know what the lawsuit will turn on. For example, a plaintiff may allege 
copyright infringement (a federal cause of action) but the defendant’s answer may 
simply deny the primary facts; or the answer may show she is relying on a contract 
with the plaintiff permitting her to use the copyrighted work—and the plaintiff’s 
reply may then show that the controversy between her and the plaintiff concerns 
whether the contract is valid, a question of state law, so the litigation would not 
turn on anything to do with copyright or infringement. The basic dilemma is that 
the complaint alone does not reveal what are the pivotal issues between the parties, 
and usually cannot if it is “well-pleaded.” Nonetheless, post-Mottley courts and 
                                                                                                                 
cannot be said to arise under any other law than that which creates the cause of action. It 
may be enough that the law relied upon creates a part of the cause of action although not the 
whole . . . . But the law must create at least a part of the cause of action by its own force, for 
it is the suit, not a question in the suit, that must arise under the law of the United States. The 
mere adoption by a state law of a United States law as a criterion or test, when the law of the 
United States has no force proprio vigore, does not cause a case under the state law to be 
also a case under the law of the United States, and so it has been decided by this Court again 
and again.”) (internal citations omitted); see also Am. Well Works, 241 U.S. 257. 
 34. Of course the defendant might still have simply denied facts, or claimed that the 
statute of limitations precluded the suit, but the “turns on” test has not been applied so 
strictly as to exclude jurisdiction because of such possibilities. Another issue that will require 
definition if a “turns on” test is adopted and given reasonable breadth, is where on the scale 
between “possibly could turn on” and “probably will turn on” the line for jurisdiction will be 
drawn, and what court will make that decision. See infra text accompanying note 146. 
 35. Rules Enabling Act of 1934, ch. 651, 48 Stat. 1064 (codified as amended at 28 
U.S.C. §§ 2072–2074 (2006)). 
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jurists continued to refer to “turns on federal law” as an important part of federal 
question jurisdiction.36 
If one believes that federal courts should be able to hear controversies about 
federal law, the “turns on” test cannot achieve that end. Instead, the vast majority of 
cases that test would admit to the federal jurisdiction will be kept out for failure to 
satisfy the well-pleaded complaint rule. In fact, precluding such cases from 
jurisdiction is the principal role played by applying the well-pleaded complaint rule 
at the stage of removal. Accordingly, the “turns on federal law” test survived 
Mottley, but was left with almost no room in which to operate. 
Jurists seemed not to appreciate this interaction between the traditional “arising 
under” test and the well-pleaded complaint requirement. Judge Friendly, writing in 
1964, opined that Holmes’s formulation is “more useful for inclusion than for the 
exclusion for which it was intended,” and proceeded to set out two other bases for 
jurisdiction, including a “turns on” test.37 Friendly’s support for the existence of 
this pivotal federal question approach includes only Smith, discussed above, and 
DeSylva v. Ballentine,38 a case in which the jurisdictional issue was not mentioned 
in any of the Supreme Court opinions.39 
                                                                                                                 
 
 36.  
The doctrine captures the commonsense notion that a federal court ought to be 
able to hear claims recognized under state law that nonetheless turn on 
substantial questions of federal law, and thus justify resort to the experience, 
solicitude, and hope of uniformity that a federal forum offers on federal issues. 
Grable & Sons Metal Prods. v. Darue Eng’g & Mfg., 545 U.S. 308, 312 (2005). 
 37. T.B. Harms Co. v. Eliscu, 339 F.2d 823, 827 (2d Cir. 1964). Friendly also 
tentatively suggested a special rule for federal common law, an approach that has not been 
adopted. See id. at 828. Instead, federal common law has been treated like other federal law 
and has given rise to federal jurisdiction when it creates a federal cause of action. Common 
law issues like others are subject to a well-pleaded complaint rule. 
 38. 351 U.S. 570 (1956). 
 39. Indeed Friendly may have gotten the jurisdictional issue of DeSylva wrong. Writing 
in T.B. Harms, Friendly opined: 
[A] case may ‘arise under’ a law of the United States if the complaint discloses 
a need for determining the meaning or application of such a law. . . . A recent 
application of this principle . . . is De Sylva v. Ballentine . . . where the 
Supreme Court decided on the merits a claim to partial ownership of copyright 
renewal terms. 
T.B. Harms, 339 F.2d at 827 (internal citations omitted). Friendly at least forgot to go 
through the steps required to bring a declaratory judgment to federal court, see infra text 
accompanying notes 55–56, and DeSylva was a declaratory judgment action. In fact, it is not 
clear that either party had a possible infringement action against the other in DeSylva, and 
infringement is the only federal cause of action under the federal Copyright Act, as Friendly 
holds in T.B. Harms. Therefore DeSylva could not satisfy the well-pleaded complaint rule 
under Skelly Oil. It would not even have satisfied it if the Skelly Oil rule had been liberalized 
with Edelmann, as it is today. See infra text accompanying note 86–87. Moreover, even if 
DeSylva had qualified for jurisdiction under the Skelly-Edelmann rules, that would not make 
it a “turns on” case but rather a federal cause-of-action case. Skelly Oil requires that federal 
jurisdiction be based on causes of action that would or could have been brought if the 
declaratory judgment act were not available and thus appears a subset of the federal cause of 
action test for declaratory judgments. Skelly Oil v. Phillips Petroleum, 339 U.S. 667 (1950). 
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A stronger argument might have been that “turns on federal law” was an 
undisputed basis for “arising under” jurisdiction from the outset of general federal 
question jurisdiction, and that it makes sense for such cases to be decided by 
federal courts. Moreover the Supreme Court—unlike Holmes—has never squarely 
repudiated that test for jurisdiction (that is, other than by adopting the well-pleaded 
complaint rule). 
Friendly’s position—that a federal cause of action was but one avenue to federal 
question jurisdiction, and that another concerned cases that turned on federal law—
became the classical position of commentators and courts. Indeed, Friendly’s 
“more useful for inclusion than for the exclusion for which it was intended” 
remark40 was in turn picked up by the ALI’s 1969 study of federal courts41 and then 
inserted verbatim into federal court treatises and federal question opinions.42 But 
although the commentators were in agreement, they too paid insufficient attention 
to the effect of the well-pleaded complaint rule upon the substantive question of 
what “arises under” federal law in the general federal question statute. 
I am suggesting that Holmes’s position on the exclusivity of the federal cause of 
action test may correctly describe the law, then and now. At least it is almost 
correct, because of the near absence of cases within the pivotal federal question 
category.43 The “turns on federal law” proponents do purport to retain the well-
pleaded complaint rule,44 although occasionally they forget about it or ignore it.45 
Of course the well-pleaded complaint rule would be compatible with “turns on” 
jurisdiction if the nub of the controversy were required, by the rules of pleading, to 
be put forward in the initial complaint. That seems to have been the situation in 
                                                                                                                 
 
 40. T.B. Harms, 339 F.2d at 827. 
 41. See AM. LAW INST., supra note 4, at 483 (“If . . . the justification for original federal 
question jurisdiction is the need for uniformity in the construction of federal law, and the 
danger that state courts will misunderstand that law or lack sympathy with it, the Holmes test 
is both too narrow and too broad.”). 
 42. See generally Jones v. R.R. Donnelley & Sons Co., 541 U.S. 369, 377 (2004); 
Merrell Dow Pharm. Inc. v. Thompson, 478 U.S. 804, 809 n.5 (1986). 
 43. Later, I will show that other tests that lead to federal question jurisdiction can all be 
conceptualized as part of the federal cause of action category—for example, a category of 
jurisdiction involving federal preemption that has developed since Friendly spoke, starting 
only in 1968. See Avco Corp. v. Aero Lodge No. 735, Int’l Ass’n of Machinists & 
Aerospace Workers, 390 U.S. 557 (1968). 
 44. This is demonstrable from Friendly in T.B. Harms, to Brennan in Franchise Tax, 
and cases in between and since, even though it is this requirement that takes away 
everything, or almost everything, that the “turns on” test puts into the jurisdiction. On the 
other hand, if the well-pleaded complaint rule did not have this effect, it would have no 
effect at all; it rarely matters in the federal cause of action context because one would expect 
the cause of action always to appear on the face of the well-pleaded complaint. But see Duke 
Power Co. v. Carolina Envtl. Study Grp., Inc., 438 U.S. 59 (1978); Avco Corp., 390 U.S. 
557. 
 45. See Duke Power Co., 438 U.S. at 69–70 n.13 (concluding that petitioners’ claim that 
the Price-Anderson Act, which limits the rights to recovery for potential victims of nuclear 
disasters, would violate their due process rights could be interpreted to constitute “an 
essential ingredient of a well-pleaded complaint asserting a right under the Constitution”); 
DeSylva v. Ballentine, 351 U.S. 570, 570–84 (1956). 
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Smith, and one could devise similar rules for federal pleading. A better informed 
judgment could then be made about the likelihood of a case turning on federal law 
as a way of determining jurisdiction. Sometimes, of course, a plaintiff does not 
know his defendant’s position, and such an approach could not work. But in certain 
actions, most noticeably declaratory judgment actions, the appropriate pleading 
does describe the controversy between the parties. 
B. Treatment of Declaratory Judgment Actions: A Missed Opportunity to Simplify, 
Clarify, and Rationalize 
The easy solution of accepting jurisdiction over cases with pivotal federal 
questions appearing on the face of a declaratory judgment complaint (or any other 
form of action that required the pleading of the issues apparently at controversy) 
was discarded by Justice Frankfurter in Skelly Oil v. Phillips Petroleum,46 
somewhat to the dismay of classical federal court scholars.47 Frankfurter pointed 
out that the Declaratory Judgment Act was “procedural only” and was not intended, 
according to congressional debates, to increase federal courts’ jurisdiction. He 
concluded that a well-pleaded declaratory judgment complaint disclosing a case 
that would turn on federal law was not sufficient to support federal question 
jurisdiction.48 
The legislative history that Frankfurter referred to, and the very real concern it 
embodies, is that the Declaratory Judgment Act does not sanction federal courts 
deciding matters which are not “cases or controversies”—that is, that are not 
sufficiently adverse or developed that a court should intervene. Doctrinally, they 
are not “ripe,” or the parties may not have standing. The question is a particularly 
delicate one in the declaratory judgment area, because one point of the action is to 
intervene earlier than coercive law might—sometimes in order to save a party from 
being caught between a rock and a hard place. When, for example, federal 
employees were not allowed to be politically active even on their own free time as 
a condition of their employment,49 they might not have wanted to risk their jobs to 
test the constitutionality of the law even though the law had an active effect by 
inhibiting them from engaging in politics. A declaratory judgment procedure could 
give them a way to test the validity of the law, so that if the Constitution so 
                                                                                                                 
 
 46. 339 U.S. 667 (1950). 
 47. See Mishkin, supra note 16, at 184 (arguing that the holding was mere dictum 
because the issue fell outside the scope of the federal question statute regardless of the cause 
of action: “Thus, despite powerful dictum to the contrary in Skelly Oil, the case is 
distinguishable, and there remains the possibility of the declaratory judgment being given 
full credence as a new and independent form of action for purposes of applying the ‘well-
pleaded on the face of the complaint’ test of original federal question jurisdiction.”); see also 
RICHARD H. FALLON, JR., DANIEL J. MELTZER & DAVID L. SHAPIRO, HART AND WECHSLER’S 
THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM (5th ed. 2003). 
 48. Skelly Oil, 339 U.S. at 671–74. 
 49. Hatch Act § 9(a), 5 U.S.C. § 7324(a)(2) (2006) (“An employee may not engage in 
political activity . . . in any room or building occupied in the discharge of official duties by 
an individual employed or holding office in the Government of the United States or any 
agency or instrumentality thereof.”). 
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ordained, they could keep their job and also exercise political rights; and even if 
they lost on the merits, they would still have their jobs.50 
Although Frankfurter was correct in one sense in considering the Declaratory 
Judgment Act “procedural only,” that fact does not support his decision that a well-
pleaded declaratory judgment complaint was insufficient to support federal 
question jurisdiction, even if it showed the case turned on federal law. The pleading 
rules of other forms of action also are “procedural only,” in the sense that they were 
not adopted with the intent of affecting federal jurisdiction any more than was the 
Declaratory Judgment Act. The forms of action simply distribute the pleading 
burdens in the case, saying what the plaintiff must plead and what the defendant is 
responsible for raising, whether in a contract action, a tort action, or an 
infringement case. When the elements to be pleaded were originally established for 
a breach of contract cause of action, or for adverse possession or quiet title actions, 
to give a few examples, the considerations had nothing to do with state or federal 
jurisdiction. The requirements for these various forms of action were established by 
tradition and common law and are discussed in Chitty’s Pleading and Parties to 
Actions51 and other nineteenth century treatises. 
What is considered the plaintiff’s and what is considered the defendant’s part of 
the case often is arbitrary. And the lines drawn may depend less on the facts of the 
controversy than on the different writs of action themselves.52 For example, if a 
federal government official is occupying your land and you sue in ejectment, the 
federal issue will not appear on the well-pleaded complaint, but it will if you sue 
for injunctive relief.53 Similarly, if there is a dispute about ownership of real 
property, the properly drafted equitable writ to remove a cloud on title, often 
characterized as a quiet title action, will set forth the full controversy in the 
plaintiff’s initial pleading.54 
Accordingly, none of the forms of action or their pleading requirements were 
developed with the intent to determine federal jurisdiction. It is only the Supreme 
Court that made the pleading requirements of particular traditional causes of action 
important and determinative by having them define which cases should qualify for 
federal question jurisdiction.55 
                                                                                                                 
 
 50. U.S. Civil Serv. Comm’n v. Nat’l Ass'n of Letter Carriers, 413 U.S. 548 (1973). 
 51. See JOSEPH CHITTY, PLEADING AND PARTIES TO ACTIONS, WITH PRECEDENTS (1809). 
 52. “So great is the ascendancy of the Law of Actions in the Infancy of Courts of 
Justice, that substantive law has at first the look of being gradually secreted in the interstices 
of procedure; and the early lawyer can only see the law through the envelope of its technical 
forms.” HENRY SUMNER MAINE, DISSERTATIONS ON EARLY LAW AND CUSTOM 389 (1883). 
 53. White v. Sparkhill Realty Corp., 280 U.S. 500 (1930); see JAMES LANDON HIGH, A 
TREATISE ON THE LAW OF INJUNCTIONS (1880); JOHN J. MCKELVEY, PRINCIPLES OF COMMON-
LAW PLEADING (1917); 11 ALBERT H. PUTNEY, COMMON LAW PLEADING COD LEADING 
FEDERAL PROCEDURE EVIDENCE 24 (1908). 
 54. See generally 6 CYCLOPEDIA OF LAW AND PROCEDURE 287 (William Mach & 
Howard P. Nash eds.,1903); 32 CYCLOPEDIA OF LAW AND PROCEDURE 1296 et seq. (William 
Mack ed., 1909); 34 CYCLOPEDIA OF LAW AND PROCEDURE 614 (William Mack ed., 1910); 
37 CYCLOPEDIA OF LAW AND PROCEDURE 1488 (William Mac ed., 1911). See also Hopkins v. 
Walker, 244 U.S. 486 (1917). 
 55. The language of the general federal question statute is almost identical to that 
concerning federal question jurisdiction in the Constitution, but the constitutional language is 
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The Supreme Court in Skelly Oil did not rule that declaratory judgment actions 
were per se precluded from the federal question jurisdiction. Instead, it went behind 
the declaratory judgment complaint to ascertain what suit would have been brought 
in the absence of the declaratory judgment action. If that imagined suit would 
qualify for federal question jurisdiction (presumably because it was a federal cause 
of action), then the declaratory judgment action could be heard in federal court.56 
Otherwise, it must go to state court. 
There are many problems with turning jurisdiction on what suit the declaratory 
judgment is essentially replacing. One difficulty with requiring identification of 
another cause of action is that the declaratory judgment procedure is often used 
when there is no coercive proceeding yet available.57 The declaratory judgment 
procedure sometimes allows the parties to proceed without having to violate the 
law in order to test it. Skelly Oil does not reveal whether the “coercive action that 
would have been brought” can include actions that could not yet be brought. 
Another vexatious question has been whether an action that could be brought by 
either party is sufficient to provide jurisdiction, or whether the imagined action 
must have the same party plaintiff as the declaratory suit.58 Whatever the resolution 
to these persistent issues, basing the existence or nonexistence of federal 
jurisdiction upon an imagined suit rather than the suit at hand makes creative 
lawyering important in procuring federal jurisdiction and reinforces uncertainty 
concerning the jurisdictional law. 
                                                                                                                 
interpreted much more broadly than that in the statute. The courts have crafted tests for the 
statutory jurisdiction like the federal cause of action test in order to limit the number of cases 
that would otherwise be in the federal courts. 
 56.  
The Declaratory Judgment Act allowed relief to be given by way of recognizing 
the plaintiff's right even though no immediate enforcement of it was asked. But 
the requirements of jurisdiction—the limited subject matters which alone 
Congress had authorized the District Courts to adjudicate—were not impliedly 
repealed or modified. 
Skelly Oil Co. v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 339 U.S. 667, 671–72 (1950). 
 57. See Duke Power Co. v. Carolina Envtl. Study Grp., Inc., 438 U.S. 59 (1978); GNB 
Battery Techs., Inc. v. Gould, Inc., 65 F.3d 615 (7th Cir. 1995) (allowing a declaratory 
judgment action for indemnification from potential CERCLA liability between two 
companies when CERCLA enforcement actions had not been instigated); Nuclear Eng’g Co. 
v. Scott, 660 F.2d 241, 252 (7th Cir. 1981) (allowing a declaratory judgment to determine 
RCRA liability when actions had been threatened but not yet taken) (“At the time NEC’s 
complaint was filed, the alleged controversy between it and defendant Scott was based 
entirely upon his April 22, 1980 announcement that he intended at some future date to bring 
an action against NEC alleging violations of Illinois’ environmental protection laws. Of 
course, a plaintiff need not always await the actual commencement of enforcement 
proceedings to challenge the authority under which those proceedings would be brought. 
E.g., Babbitt v. United Farm Workers, 442 U.S. 289, 298 (1979); Lake Carriers’ Association 
v. MacMullan, 406 U.S. 498, 507–08 (1972). However, for such an action to present a 
justiciable controversy the threat of enforcement must have immediate coercive 
consequences of some sort upon the plaintiff. Id. at 508 n.12; Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 
508 (1961).” (parallel citations omitted)). 
 58. The Supreme Court has now resolved this choice in favor of the “either party” 
alternative. See infra text accompanying note 86–87. 
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Many, including myself, think that Frankfurter got it wrong; he should have 
accepted declaratory judgments disclosing a controversy about federal law into the 
federal courts in their own right.59 In ruling them out, he contributed greatly to the 
irrationality and uncertainty of federal question jurisdiction. Nonetheless the Court 
has stuck with the rule. Indeed, in Franchise Tax, the Court even extended it to 
state declaratory judgment actions because of “fidelity to the spirit” of Skelly Oil.60 
(Brennan did not just forget that no one likes the Skelly Oil rule; a footnote explains 
his view that “any adjustment in the system that has evolved under the Skelly Oil 
rule must come from Congress.”)61 
The end result is that the tests for federal question jurisdiction remain in a state 
of confusion, and a category of jurisdiction of central importance for federal courts 
has almost nothing in it. When one does discover a case admitted to federal court 
because it “turns on federal law,” one finds that the admission was almost always 
by mistake, usually in disregard of Skelly Oil.62 One reason is that these cases 
appear “so federal” that they proceed as federal question cases without anyone 
thinking to question jurisdiction. But the problem is that anyone can notice the flaw 
at any time, thereby potentially voiding years of litigation. 
At least in declaratory judgment proceedings (and any other complaint that, 
well-pleaded, discloses the nub of the controversy),63 the pivotal question should 
control jurisdiction, not the form of action that allows it to be pleaded.64 
C. The Jurisprudence of the Last Twenty-Five Years 
During much of the twentieth century the law was in disarray, Congress failed to 
regulate, and the Supreme Court did not clarify the criteria for federal question 
jurisdiction. Some scholars actually proclaimed that an analytically sound test was 
not possible and should not be sought.65 
Meanwhile the Supreme Court seemed ready to create bold new law, good for 
one case and that case only, rather than squarely address the need for a real “turns 
on federal law” jurisdiction. In Duke Power v. Carolina Environmental Study 
Group, Inc., the constitutionality of the federal Price Anderson Act, governing the 
                                                                                                                 
 
 59. Whether Skelly Oil itself should have been included in federal question jurisdiction 
is another matter. The federal issue was relevant only because it had been incorporated into a 
private contract; federal law had no application to the case apart from the parties’ agreement. 
See infra text accompanying note 149 (suggesting that such cases not qualify for federal 
question jurisdiction). 
 60. Franchise Tax Bd. of Cal. v. Constr. Laborers Vacation Trust, 463 U.S. 1, 18 (1983). 
 61. Id. at 18 n.17. 
 62. See, e.g., Duke Power Co., 438 U.S. 59; De Sylva v. Ballentine, 351 U.S. 570 
(1956). In TB Harms, 339 F.2d 823 (2d Cir. 1964), Judge Friendly undertook a full review of 
federal question issues seemingly without noticing that Skelly Oil was applicable to that 
declaratory judgment action. 
 63. See infra text accompanying notes 127–28. 
 64. In that sense, Holmes’s description of the federal cause of action test as the only one 
was in fact overinclusive. Holmes spoke before the Declaratory Judgment Act became law. 
 65. E.g., William Cohen, The Broken Compass: The Requirement that a Case Arise 
“Directly” under Federal Law, 115 U. PA. L. REV. 890 (1967). 
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building and liability of nuclear power plants, was the matter in dispute.66 The suit 
was brought by “two organizations—Carolina Environmental Study Group and the 
Catawba Central Labor Union—and 40 individuals who live[d] within close 
proximity” to nuclear facilities planned by Duke Power.67 As in Mottley, the federal 
jurisdictional problem went unnoticed until the case was in the U.S. Supreme 
Court, but, as Justice Rehnquist clearly demonstrated in dissent, the case shared 
Mottley’s flaw: The cause of action arose strictly under state law—with federal law 
not arising before pleading of the defense.68 Rather than face the inadequacy of its 
federal jurisdiction rules, and their ousting from jurisdiction even cases where 
important federal issues are the sole subject of dispute, the majority, led by Chief 
Justice Burger, decreed that jurisdiction existed in this case, and did so without 
purporting to establish any new tests for federal jurisdiction. 
The Chief Justice essentially rewrote the plaintiffs declaratory judgment 
complaint to claim a cause of action against the Nuclear Regulatory Commission 
(NRC) arising under the Fifth Amendment due process and takings clauses—
“directly under the Constitution.”69 Then having postulated this possible federal 
cause of action, the Chief Justice found it unnecessary to decide whether it in fact 
existed; it was enough that it was sufficiently “substantial” to establish federal 
question jurisdiction. The Chief Justice thus went on to decide the case without 
regard to whether there was an actual federal cause of action to support jurisdiction 
of state claims.70 Such a bootstrap approach to federal jurisdiction, which provided 
a path around the established Mottley holding, if it were repeatedly used in other 
cases, could provide federal question jurisdiction very broadly.71 
                                                                                                                 
 
 66. Duke Power Co., 438 U.S. 59. 
 67. Id. at 67. 
 68. Id. at 96–97 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (“It is apparent that appellees’ first asserted 
basis for relief does not state a claim ‘arising under’ the Price-Anderson Act. Their 
complaint alleges that the operation of the two power plants will cause immediate injury to 
property within their vicinity. The District Court explicitly found that these injuries ‘give rise 
to an immediate right of action for redress. Under the law of North Carolina a right of action 
arises as soon as a wrongful act has created “any injury, however slight,” to the plaintiff.’ 
This right of action provided by state, not federal, law is the property of which the appellees 
contend the Act deprives them without due process. Thus, the constitutionality of the Act 
becomes relevant only if the appellant Duke Power Co. were to invoke the Act as a defense 
to appellees’ suit for recovery under their North Carolina right of action.” (internal citations 
omitted)). 
 69. Id. 
 70. Justice Rehnquist argued convincingly that no such cause of action existed and that 
the only cause of action was the state cause of action for damage to property. He understood 
that the Chief Justice’s reliance on the NRC was an effort to satisfy the state action 
component of the claimed constitutional complaint and was also necessary in order to meet 
the then-existing jurisdictional amount, but he pointed out that the plaintiffs had no 
grievance against the NRC and that it would have been equally as plausible for the Mottleys 
to have joined a federal agency charged with administering the railroads, supporting their 
claim against the railroads themselves under only supplemental jurisdiction. Id. at 64 n.2. 
 71. It would greatly increase the expanse of “federal cause of action,” but it still does 
not rely upon a “turns on federal law” rationale. 
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Burger had what he considered reasons of statesmanship for insisting on 
deciding the Duke Power controversy on the merits, despite an apparent lack of 
federal jurisdiction under existing tests (and an equal lack of justiciability in federal 
court under existing approaches to case and controversy, standing, and ripeness 
doctrines). Burger’s problem was that a ruling that the Court could not pass on the 
merits would have left the constitutionality of the Price Anderson Act in doubt, a 
situation that might have discouraged any development of nuclear power plants. 
The likelihood of affecting would-be nuclear developers was increased because the 
district court had reached the merits of the case and had held the Price Anderson 
Act unconstitutional on the plaintiffs’ theories. Although that opinion would 
formally lack force if the Supreme Court pronounced an absence of jurisdiction, it 
would remain the only opinion that had addressed the constitutional question on the 
merits and thus might carry weight in discouraging nuclear development. 
Franchise Tax72, a 1983 opinion, in some ways seems a refreshing change from 
this kind of avoidance. In its first serious effort since Smith v. Kansas City Title & 
Trust Co.73 to give guidance about the contours of federal question jurisdiction, the 
Court unanimously lays out answers to several specific longstanding questions 
pertaining to “turns on” jurisdiction. But the various answers do not fit easily 
together, and when in the end the opinion refuses to follow the result that its clear 
rules have led it to, the opinion does not add so much guidance after all. When 
considered for its effects on “turns on” jurisdiction, the rules set forth are an odd 
amalgam of positions, some supporting “turns on” jurisdiction and some that are 
destructive of it. 
Another strange facet is the twists and turns in the opinion itself. Justice 
Brennan opened by saying that the question in dispute—whether the Employee 
Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA)74 “permits state tax authorities to 
collect unpaid state income taxes by levying on funds held in trust for the taxpayers 
under an ERISA-covered vacation benefit plan”75—“is an important one, which 
affects thousands of federally regulated trusts and all nonfederal tax collection 
systems, and it must eventually receive a definitive, uniform resolution.”76 
California, through its Franchise Tax Board, sued the trust, Construction Laborers 
Vacation Trust (CLTV), for refusing to hand over all amounts held for the 
delinquent taxpayers; CLVT defended on the ground that ERISA prohibits it from 
complying. The Tax Board sued in state court, seeking damages and a declaration 
that CLVT must obey all its future tax levies. 
CLVT removed the case to federal court, which denied a motion to remand and 
held on the merits for the Tax Board. The court of appeals reversed, claiming 
ERISA provides for federal preemption.77 On this appeal, the Supreme Court held 
                                                                                                                 
 
 72. Franchise Tax Bd. v. Constr. Laborers, 463 U.S. 1 (1983). 
 73. 225 U.S. 180 (1921). 
 74. Pub. L. 93-406, 88 Stat. 829 (1974) (codified in scattered sections of 29 U.S.C.). 
 75. Franchise Tax Bd. of Cal. v. Constr. Laborers Vacation Trust, 463 U.S. 1, 3–4 
(1983). 
 76. Id. at 4. 
 77. The Ninth Circuit reversed the district court based on a preemption argument:  
The same chapter of ERISA that describes the scope of protection of employee 
pension benefits provides for federal preemption in connection with welfare 
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that the federal courts lacked removal jurisdiction in the case. In the course of so 
holding, it wrote a major opinion evidently trying to clarify the important open 
questions in this area of law. After this clarification, however, Brennan adopts a 
“pragmatic” discretionary approach, departing from the clear rules he had 
previously announced and also thereby avoiding decision of the question he had at 
the outset deemed so important to answer. 
Brennan’s opinion for the Court takes the position that the federal cause of 
action test is not the exclusive test for federal question jurisdiction and that those 
state causes of action in which the complaint shows that the case will turn on 
federal law are also eligible for federal question jurisdiction.78 Brennan clearly 
endorses this category of jurisdiction, and is its long-time supporter,79 but here he 
also notes, for the first time in a Supreme Court opinion, that the well-pleaded 
complaint cuts back severely on the number of cases without federal causes of 
action that can be heard in federal court. Curiously, in this case he acts as though 
that is a benefit, because it “avoid[s] more-or-less automatically a number of 
potentially serious federal-state conflicts”;80 nonetheless he accepts the well-
pleaded complaint rule as established and settled, while admitting it produces 
“awkward results” when it precludes jurisdiction for cases (like Duke Power and 
Mottley) in which the only question for decision is federal.81 
But, says Brennan, “Even though state law creates appellant’s causes of action, 
its case might still ‘arise under’ the laws of the United States if a well-pleaded 
complaint established that its right to relief under state law requires resolution of a 
substantial question of federal law in dispute between the parties.”82 The damages 
cause of action was not in original federal question jurisdiction (except as 
supplemental to a proper federal claim), because a proper complaint requires only 
state law, and the federal ERISA issue arose only in defense. But the other state 
                                                                                                                 
benefit plans. 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a). See Alessi v. Raybestos-Manhattan, Inc., 
451 U.S. 504, 522 (1981). The vacation trust fund now before the court is 
obviously a benefit plan described in § 1002(1). Accordingly, under the 
teaching of the Alessi case, which had not been decided when this matter was 
before the district court, we have no choice but to reverse with directions to 
enter judgment for the appellants. 
Franchise Tax Bd. of Cal. v. Constr. Laborers Vacation Trust, 679 F.2d 1307, 1309 (9th Cir. 
1982) (parallel citations omitted). 
 78. Brennan uses language to describe the test that combines with the well-pleaded 
complaint rule, describing it variously as cases in which “in order for the plaintiff to secure 
the relief sought he will be obliged to establish both the correctness and the applicability to 
his case of a proposition of federal law,” Franchise Tax, 463 U.S. at 9 (quoting another 
source), cases in which “the complaint discloses a need for determining the meaning or 
application of [federal] law,” id. (quoting T.B. Harms Co. v. Eliscu, 339 F.2d 823, 827 (2d 
Cir. 1964)), or “cases in which a well-pleaded complaint establishes . . . that the plaintiff’s 
right to relief necessarily depends on resolution of a substantial question of federal law,” id. 
at 27–28. Brennan also uses the more conventional “turns on” federal law. Id. at 28. 
 79. See, e.g., Wheeldin v. Wheeler, 373 U.S. 647, 659–60 (1963) (Brennan, J., 
dissenting) (“In short, there is federal-question jurisdiction if a proposition of federal law is 
inherent in the plaintiff’s claim.”). 
 80. Franchise Tax, 463 U.S. at 10. 
 81. Id. at 12. 
 82. Id. at 13. 
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cause of action, the declaratory judgment action, was potentially more promising. 
The full controversy, with its important federal issues, appeared upon the complaint 
and was required to do so by California’s declaratory judgment pleading rules.83 
The situation thus was much like Skelly Oil, except that the state declaratory 
judgment statute was at issue instead of the federal one. Franchise Tax provided an 
opportunity for the Court to limit Skelly Oil’s effect by not applying its reasoning 
when a plaintiff sued in state court under the state declaratory judgment statute and 
the defendant removed to federal court. Surely the pragmatic case for federal 
question jurisdiction exists when the parties and the district court know that a suit 
will revolve around federal law. Indeed that is why it is in declaratory judgment 
cases that the courts most often do not notice the absence of federal question 
jurisdiction; Skelly Oil is often forgotten and the cases proceed to decide the 
obviously federal issues.84 
The issue of how to treat state declaratory judgments had not yet been resolved. 
Applying a different rationale to state declaratory judgments than to the Federal 
Declaratory Judgment Act might have relaxed the tension between the federal 
cause of action test and the disputed federal question test, and made federal 
jurisdiction more rational and more manageable. 
Brennan recognized that Skelly Oil does not directly govern state declaratory 
judgment statutes, but nonetheless concluded that “fidelity to [Skelly Oil’s] spirit” 
required the same analysis and result for state declaratory actions.85 Hence Brennan 
stuck to Skelly Oil and extended its approach to state declaratory judgment actions 
seeking entry to federal courts. In then applying the Skelly Oil rule, he answered 
another question about Skelly Oil that many had considered open: whether in 
determining the coercive action that would otherwise have been brought and that 
must support jurisdiction, a judge should look only to traditional causes of action 
that the plaintiff could have brought against the defendant, or instead include 
actions that the defendant could bring against the plaintiff. Brennan claimed that 
“[f]ederal courts have regularly taken original jurisdiction over declaratory 
judgment suits in which, if the declaratory judgment defendant brought a coercive 
action to enforce its rights, that suit would necessarily present a federal question.”86 
Hart and Wechsler in their casebook had also suggested Brennan’s statement as 
the prevailing rule, out of a distaste for Skelly Oil and a desire to limit its effects. 
Although they had claimed that the rule was followed generally, their casebook 
cited only one case—a patent case—ignoring the many other cases that did not 
accept that rule. The case they relied upon was E. Edelmann & Co. v. Triple-A 
Specialty Co.,87 and for that reason I refer to this position, adopted as the Court’s 
                                                                                                                 
 
 83. California requires a party to plead “‘facts showing the existence of an actual 
controversy relating to the legal rights and duties of the parties’” in order to obtain a 
declaratory judgment. Id. at 14 n.13 (quoting Wellenkamp v. Bank of Am., 582 P.2d 970, 
972 (Cal. 1978)). 
 84. See, e.g., Duke Power Co. v. Carolina Envtl. Study Grp., Inc., 438 U.S. 59 (1978); 
De Sylva v. Ballentine, 351 U.S. 570 (1956); see also T.B. Harms Co. v. Elisou, 339 F.2d 
823 (2d Cir. 1964). 
 85. Franchise Tax, 463 U.S. at 18. 
 86. Id. at 19. 
 87. 88 F.2d 852 (7th Cir. 1937), cert. denied, 300 U.S. 680 (1937). 
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view in Franchise Tax, as “the Edelmann rule.” To recap, the Edelmann rule, a 
modification or interpretation of Skelly Oil, is: The possibility of a coercive action 
brought by the defendant that would qualify for federal question jurisdiction is 
sufficient to allow federal jurisdiction of a declaratory judgment action. Adopting 
this rule resolved an open issue on which there had been disagreement, despite the 
Court’s and the Hart and Wechsler casebook’s early implication of a consensus. 
Adopting and consistently following the Edelmann test results in admission to 
federal courts of more cases in which federal law is pivotal than rejection of the test 
would. The proposed removal reform is broader, however, because it would allow 
the choice of federal court in cases with dispositive federal issues but without any 
coercive federal cause of action available to either party. (The proposal is also 
broader because it would allow federal jurisdiction for the small number of cases in 
which the pivotal federal issue emerges only in the plaintiff’s reply.) 
Seemingly, Brennan’s approval of the Edelmann rule would allow Franchise 
Tax to remove to federal court, for ERISA explicitly grants trustees like CLVT “a 
cause of action for injunctive relief when their rights and duties under ERISA are at 
issue, and that action is exclusively governed by federal law.”88 But having found 
that CLVT could bring a coercive suit and that the possibility of coercive suits by 
defendants does satisfy Skelly Oil’s requirement of a federal cause of action, 
Brennan decided that the rule allowing jurisdiction should not apply in this case. 
Why did Brennan exercise discretion to avoid what he had called “an important” 
issue that needs federal resolution?89 The holding also makes unnecessary all the 
other reasoning in the case. Brennan asserted that federal court jurisdiction had 
always been decided “with an eye to practicality and necessity.”90 Then instead of 
focusing on the necessity of deciding this important ERISA issue, he said that 
states were “not significantly prejudiced by an inability to come to federal court” 
before the injunctive suit that the defendant could admittedly bring in federal court 
against the state.91 
That may of course be true, but in this case the rule was not designed to favor or 
comfort the state. It was not the state that had sought federal jurisdiction—it was 
the defendant on removal. It had satisfied all of the tests that Brennan had just 
announced were the law of federal question jurisdiction. 
A footnote may disclose that attention to state concerns was in fact the main 
reason for the Court’s holding. In footnote 22, Brennan pointed out that these cases 
will come to federal court most often by removal and that “considerations of 
comity make us reluctant to snatch cases which a State has brought from the courts 
of that State, unless some clear rule demands it.”92 Such a rationale, of course, 
could affect whether other Edelmann cases are accepted in federal forums. If the 
rationale was limited to cases brought by states,93 it is too bad that was not well 
explained and did not even appear in the body of the opinion. 
                                                                                                                 
 
 88. Franchise Tax, 463 U.S. at 19–20. 
 89. Id. at 4. 
 90. Id. at 20. 
 91. Id. at 21. 
 92. Id. at 21 n.22. 
 93. The attention to possibilities of prejudice to states in disallowing removal, without 
any attention to harms to defendants, supports Brennan’s focus upon federal-state comity in 
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Thus the Franchise Tax opinion endorses both the “turns on” test and the well-
pleaded complaint rule. It supports and extends Skelly Oil but then adopts an 
interpretation put forward by Skelly Oil’s critics in order to limit the effect of the 
rule. And having done all that, Brennan then claimed a broad-ranging discretion to 
discard the result his rules require and to decline to decide an issue he earlier 
claimed was important and needed to be settled. In many ways, in the name of 
pragmatism he produces a most unpragmatic result. 
Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals v. Thompson94 followed three years later. It 
added confusion, for the Court’s opinion appeared to contradict Franchise Tax’s 
endorsement of a “turns on” test and to support federal cause of action as the sole 
basis for federal jurisdiction. This time the Court was divided, 5–4, with Stevens 
writing for the Court and Brennan authoring the dissent. The result was twenty 
more years of utter confusion as to what were the rules for federal jurisdiction, at 
which time the Court granted certiorari in Grable v. Darue95 in order to resolve a 
conflict among the circuits concerning the same old question: whether a federal 
cause of action was always required for statutory “arising under” jurisdiction. 
Merrell Dow concerned a product liability tort for per se negligence. Two 
foreign claimants whose children were born with severe birth defects alleged that 
Merrell Dow’s drug Bendectin was responsible. They sued in Ohio state court for 
substantial damages. Multiple counts were alleged, one of which charged per se 
negligence for “misbranding” in violation of the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic 
Act (FDCA);96 the claim was that the company’s failure to provide adequate 
warning, as mandated by that statute, “constitute[d] a rebuttable presumption of 
negligence.”97 
Defendant petitioned for removal to federal court, arguing that this statutory 
negligence claim made the case, in part, arise under federal law. Removal was 
granted by the district court, but subsequently the court of appeals reversed.98 The 
FDCA, which inter alia establishes federal standards for labeling, provides no 
private right to action.99 Allowing federal jurisdiction for state law negligence 
claims on this ground could open to federal courts a broad category of potential tort 
claims, historically the domain of state judiciaries.100 
Merrell Dow seemingly undercut the “turns on” test by reasoning that if 
Congress has denied a cause of action for a federal statute, the issues in that statute 
should not support “turns on” jurisdiction, even if “turns on” jurisdiction otherwise 
exists (on the face of the well-pleaded complaint).101 It is not clear from Merrell 
                                                                                                                 
this opinion’s exercise of discretion to deny jurisdiction. 
 94. 478 U.S. 804 (1986). 
 95. 545 U.S. 308 (2005). 
 96. See Merrell Dow Pharm., 478 U.S. at 805. 
 97. Id. at 806. 
 98. Id. 
 99. Id. at 806–07 (affirming the Sixth Circuit’s notation “that the FDCA does not create 
or imply a private right of action for individuals injured as a result of violations of the Act”). 
 100. Grable’s later interpretation of Merrell Dow may have stressed “traditional state 
functions” more than did Merrell Dow itself. See Grable, 545 U.S. 308. 
 101. “Given the significance of the assumed congressional determination to preclude 
federal private remedies, the presence of the federal issue as an element of the state tort is 
not the kind of adjudication for which jurisdiction would serve congressional purposes and 
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Dow whether this principle is reserved for instances in which Congress specifically 
intended not to create a federal cause of action. That standard would require that 
Congress affirmatively did not want a federal cause of action. Certainly when that 
is the case, courts should not infer a cause of action; the courts’ mission is to follow 
congressional intent in interpreting statutory remedies. 
Even if the principle were limited to specific intent, however, a “turns on” test 
would not necessarily contradict congressional intent. Not wanting a federal cause 
of action is not the equivalent of not wanting cases in federal court that turn on 
federal law. If Congress created a federal cause of action for the category of cases 
at issue, they would all be eligible for federal question jurisdiction, whether they 
turned on state or federal law or simply on the particular facts. So, allowing a case 
to be heard because it turns on federal law is not equivalent to recognizing or 
creating a federal cause of action, as Merrell Dow may imply. 
In any case, Merrell Dow may not have required specific intent but meant for its 
approach to apply whenever Congress is silent about whether a cause of action 
exists. Language in the opinion suggests this possibility,102 which is much more 
restrictive of “turns on” jurisdiction. It could, in fact, be equivalent to a rule that a 
federal cause of action is always required, as the Court pointed out in Grable.103 In 
any event, Grable reinterpreted Merrell Dow to “treat[] the absence of a federal 
private right of action as evidence relevant to, but not dispositive of, the ‘sensitive 
judgments about congressional intent’ that § 1331 requires.”104 
                                                                                                                 
the federal system.” Merrell Dow Pharm., 478 U.S. at 814. 
 102. See Merrell Dow Pharm., 478 U.S. at 812 (“The significance of the necessary 
assumption that there is no federal private cause of action thus cannot be overstated. For the 
ultimate import of such a conclusion, as we have repeatedly emphasized, is that it would 
flout congressional intent to provide a private federal remedy for the violation of the federal 
statute. We think it would similarly flout, or at least undermine, congressional intent to 
conclude that the federal courts might nevertheless exercise federal-question jurisdiction and 
provide remedies for violations of that federal statute solely because the violation of the 
federal statute is said to be a ‘rebuttable presumption’ or a ‘proximate cause’ under state law, 
rather than a federal action under federal law”); id. at 812 n.10 (“When we conclude that 
Congress has decided not to provide a particular federal remedy, we are not free to 
‘supplement’ that decision in a way that makes it ‘meaningless.’”). 
 103. Grable & Sons Metal Prods., 545 U.S. at 317 (2005) (“But an opinion is to be read 
as a whole, and Merrell Dow cannot be read whole as overturning decades of precedent, as it 
would have done by effectively adopting the Holmes dissent in Smith and converting a 
federal cause of action from a sufficient condition for federal-question jurisdiction into a 
necessary one.” (internal citation omitted)). 
 104. Id. at 318. Merrell Dow also develops at some length the theme of discretion to 
decline jurisdiction that Franchise Tax initiated, and ties that discretion to the traditional 
requirement of a substantial federal question for district court jurisdiction. See Merrell Dow 
Pharm., 478 U.S. at 810–12, 814 (“Far from creating some kind of automatic test, Franchise 
Tax Board thus candidly recognized the need for careful judgments about the exercise of 
federal judicial power in an area of uncertain jurisdiction. . . . We simply conclude that the 
congressional determination that there should be no federal remedy for the violation of this 
federal statute is tantamount to a congressional conclusion that the presence of a claimed 
violation of the statute as an element of a state cause of action is insufficiently ‘substantial’ 
to confer federal-question jurisdiction.”). Grable’s reaffirmance of Franchise Tax built upon 
only that one aspect of Merrell Dow, its requirement that the federal question be 
“substantial” in order for federal courts to exercise jurisdiction, and its inclusion of wide 
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Grable involved two private companies. In 1994 the IRS seized real estate that 
Grable owned in order to satisfy its federal tax delinquency. Grable received actual 
notice of the seizure by certified mail. When the company did not exercise its 
statutory right to redeem the property, the Government sold the property to Darue, 
whose title Grable questions in the suit, which was commenced five years later in 
Michigan state court. The complaint objected that the government sale was invalid 
because federal statutes required the IRS to have given the company notice not by 
certified mail, as had been done, but by personal service.105 
Darue removed to federal court on the ground that Grable’s complaint revealed 
a case that turned on federal law—the effect of the IRS’s mistaken form of notice 
under federal statutes. On the merits, the district court held for Darue. Although the 
statute does require personal service, there was substantial compliance and no 
prejudice. The Sixth Circuit affirmed.106 
The Supreme Court, in a unanimous opinion by Justice Souter, first held that in 
addition to a federal cause of action test, “in certain cases federal-question 
jurisdiction will lie over state-law claims that implicate significant federal 
issues.”107 In other words, said Souter, “Justice Holmes was still dissenting.”108 As 
in Franchise Tax and Merrell Dow, the Court then emphasized judicial discretion, 
but in this case unlike the others, it exercised its discretion to accept jurisdiction.109 
The Court finally backed up the Smith approach by actually finding a case to be 
accepted into federal question jurisdiction under the “turns on federal law” 
category. 
Grable’s effect on the pivotal federal question problem cannot be understood 
without also examining a different and striking part of the opinion: its endorsement 
and further development of the discretionary, “pragmatic” approach to federal 
question jurisdiction already seen in Franchise Tax and Merrell Dow. Although all 
three cases endorse judicial discretion, the Court’s description of and basis for 
discretion to decline jurisdiction changes between them. What was in Franchise 
                                                                                                                 
discretion within its definition of substantial. See Grable & Sons Metal Prods., 545 U.S. at 
318–19 (“Accordingly, Merrell Dow should be read in its entirety as treating the absence of 
a federal private right of action as evidence relevant to, but not dispositive of, the ‘sensitive 
judgments about congressional intent’ that § 1331 requires. The absence of any federal cause 
of action affected Merrell Dow’s result two ways. The Court saw the fact as worth some 
consideration in the assessment of substantiality. But its primary importance emerged when 
the Court treated the combination of no federal cause of action and no preemption of state 
remedies for misbranding as an important clue to Congress’s conception of the scope of 
jurisdiction to be exercised under § 1331. . . . Merrell Dow’s analysis thus fits within the 
framework of examining the importance of having a federal forum for the issue, and the 
consistency of such a forum with Congress’s intended division of labor between state and 
federal courts.”). Merrell Dow also makes clear in a footnote that it does not reject all “turns 
on” jurisdiction, for it supports Smith. Merrell Dow Pharm., 478 U.S. at 814 n.12. 
 105. Grable & Sons Metal Prods., 545 U.S. at 310–11. 
 106. Id. at 311. 
 107. Id. at 312. 
 108. Id. at 318. 
 109. Id. at 319–20 (“Given the absence of threatening structural consequences and the 
clear interest the Government, its buyers, and its delinquents have in the availability of a 
federal forum, there is no good reason to shirk from federal jurisdiction over the dispositive 
and contested federal issue at the heart of the state-law title claim.”). 
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Tax primarily an exercise of comity in cases initiated by states in their own courts 
(if you accept footnote 22 as the primary rationale) became much more full blown 
and generalized in Merrell Dow. This aspect of Merrell Dow was continued and 
developed in Grable. 
In Merrell Dow the majority seemed to suggest that “turns on” jurisdiction 
requires a controlling issue that the Court considers important. Brennan, in dissent, 
objected that any test basing federal jurisdiction on “ad hoc evaluation of the 
importance of the federal issue is infinitely malleable.”110 Such a vague and 
subjective test is also strikingly unsuitable for a jurisdictional issue, which stays 
open to be raised and reversed throughout the litigation. 
The suggestion in Merrell Dow is that unless a “turns on” issue is “important” 
the issue is not a “substantial federal question,” as is prerequisite to original federal 
question jurisdiction. That suggestion departs from the usual definition of a 
substantial federal question necessary to confer federal question jurisdiction; in 
other contexts only a colorable or nonfrivolous claim is required.111 A complaint 
can confer jurisdiction even if its claim is clearly incorrect. 
Merrell Dow’s definition of “substantial” within § 1331 appears closer to the 
“substantial federal question” that the Supreme Court has held necessary for 
appeals coming to the Supreme Court from state courts.112 Moreover, some of the 
other discretionary standards—such as important, or interesting and/or unsettled 
questions of federal law—seem more appropriate as standards for Supreme Court 
review than for district court jurisdiction. District courts have not typically chosen 
their cases in terms of interest or importance. Unlike the Supreme Court, they do 
not pick and choose their cases, but are charged with deciding all cases presented to 
them that fall within their jurisdiction.113 
                                                                                                                 
 
 110. Merrell Dow Pharm. Inc. v. Thompson, 478 U.S. 804, 821 n.1 (1986) (Brennan, J., 
dissenting). 
 111.  Bell v. Hood, 327 U.S. 678, 682–83 (1946) (“Jurisdiction . . . is not defeated . . . by 
the possibility that the averments might fail to state a cause of action on which petitioners 
could actually recover. For it is well settled that the failure to state a proper cause of action 
calls for a judgment on the merits and not for a dismissal for want of jurisdiction. Whether 
the complaint states a cause of action on which relief could be granted is a question of law 
and just as issues of fact it must be decided after and not before the court has assumed 
jurisdiction over the controversy. If the court does later exercise its jurisdiction to determine 
that the allegations in the complaint do not state a ground for relief, then dismissal of the 
case would be on the merits, not for want of jurisdiction. The previously carved out 
exceptions are that a suit may sometimes be dismissed for want of jurisdiction where the 
alleged claim under the Constitution or federal statutes clearly appears to be immaterial and 
made solely for the purpose of obtaining jurisdiction or where such a claim is wholly 
insubstantial and frivolous.” (internal citation omitted)). Bell deals, however, with the 
assertion of a federal remedy in an attempt to satisfy the federal cause of action test. Id. at 
678. 
 112. See Zucht v. King, 260 U.S. 174, 176 (1922) (“But, although the validity of a law 
was formally drawn in question, it is our duty to decline jurisdiction whenever it appears that 
the constitutional question presented is not, and was not at the time of granting the writ, 
substantial in character.”). 
 113. In this respect, I agree with Professor Bickel that broad discretion is considerably 
less suitable for district courts’ assessments of jurisdiction than for Supreme Court decisions 
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Grable adopts yet another approach to exercising discretion; a balancing test to 
show which cases courts should accept as federal. Assuming that state claims 
“necessarily raise a stated federal issue, actually disputed and substantial,”114 they 
must additionally “not distort any division of labor between the state and federal 
courts, provided or assumed by Congress.”115 The Court cites Merrell Dow to say 
that “there must always be an assessment of any disruptive portent in exercising 
federal jurisdiction.”116 It reframes the Merrell Dow decision from one that 
considered absence of a federal private right of action as proof of insubstantiality to 
one that “after closely examining the strength of the federal interest at stake and the 
implications of opening the federal forum, held federal jurisdiction unavailable.”117 
It was necessary to reject a private right of action in Merrell Dow because 
otherwise it “would have attracted a horde of original filings and removal cases 
raising other state claims with embedded federal issues. . . . And that would have 
meant a tremendous number of cases.”118 
With this maneuver, Grable suggests that federal jurisdiction must not be 
granted if doing so will introduce a flood of cases concerning the same federal 
statute; for frequently occurring questions of federal law, not already before U.S. 
courts through prior decision or existing private rights of action, state forums will 
have to suffice. In Grable, then, the factors to guide the courts’ discretionary 
judgment have changed substantially. 
Grable’s state claim, according to the Court, achieves federal jurisdiction 
because, although it raises important federal issues, its rarity as a quiet title case 
                                                                                                                 
about which cases to review. ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH 131–
33 (1962). An important reason is the reviewability of jurisdictional determinations and the 
disruption caused by reversal and redetermination. But see David L. Shapiro, Jurisdiction 
and Discretion, 60 N.Y.U. L. REV. 533, 566–70, 578 (1985). 
 114. Grable & Sons Metal Prods., 545 U.S. at 314. 
 115. Id. at 310. 
 116. Id. at 314. 
 117. Id. at 316. The Court in Merrell Dow did say:  
[T]he very reasons for the development of the modern implied remedy 
doctrine—the “increased complexity of federal legislation and the increased 
volume of federal litigation,” as well as “the desirability of a more careful 
scrutiny of legislative intent,” Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. 
Curran, 456 U.S. 353, 377 (1982) (footnote omitted)—are precisely the kind of 
considerations that should inform the concern for “practicality and necessity” 
that Franchise Tax Board advised for the construction of § 1331 when 
jurisdiction is asserted because of the presence of a federal issue in a state cause 
of action. 
Merrell Dow Pharm. Inc. v. Thompson, 478 U.S. 804, 811–12 (1986). 
 118. Grable & Sons Metal Prods., 545 U.S. at 318. Similarly one might argue in 
Franchise Tax that adding state initiated, state declaratory proceedings into federal court 
whenever the defendant chose to remove might lead to many new federal cases. But it is not 
clear that such a prediction would be correct. The federal courts already hear such litigation 
when the defendant is the first to sue and seeks injunctive relief; indeed they might even hear 
a suit brought in federal court for an injunction that was brought after the state had sued in 
the state. See infra Part IV (explaining concurrent state-federal litigation). Moreover, the 
time and resources saved with fewer and less complicated jurisdictional issues should be part 
of the balance of considerations. 
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that turns on federal law “will portend only a microscopic effect on the federal-state 
division of labor.”119 For a state claim to gain jurisdiction, then, it seemingly must 
raise questions important enough to demand a federal forum under circumstances 
anomalous enough to ensure its idiosyncrasy. 
An obvious objection to all of the vague standards for discretion in ruling on 
federal question jurisdiction is that it would raise havoc for such issues to be 
raisable and renewable at any stage of federal review.120 Nonetheless the Court 
claims that discretion limits which cases can enter federal court through a “turns on 
federal law” category. Cases that turn on federal law still warrant federal 
jurisdiction, but to receive it they must be state claims in which the complaint 
necessarily presents important federal questions that control the case, but that 
predictably will not arise with any frequency. As  Grable states, 
[F]ederal jurisdiction demands not only a contested federal issue, but a 
substantial one, indicating a serious federal interest in claiming the 
advantages thought to be inherent in a federal forum. 
 But even when the state action discloses a contested and substantial 
federal question, the exercise of federal jurisdiction is subject to a 
possible veto. For the federal issue will ultimately qualify for a federal 
forum only if federal jurisdiction is consistent with congressional 
judgment about the sound division of labor between state and federal 
courts . . . . [T]here must always be an assessment of any disruptive 
portent in exercising federal jurisdiction. . . . [T]he question is does, a 
state-law claim necessarily raise a stated federal issue, actually disputed 
and substantial, which a federal forum may entertain without disturbing 
any congressionally approved balance of federal and state judicial 
responsibilities.121 
Moreover such discretion apparently can be exercised even at the Supreme 
Court level, after years of federal litigation. 
Despite its amorphous and unworkable discretionary test, Grable does show us 
something: there are some state causes of action in which a properly pleaded 
complaint (other than a declaratory judgment complaint) goes far toward revealing 
the nature of the controversy. Grable, a quiet title action, was such a case. Quiet 
title actions, especially those that can be characterized as actions to remove a cloud 
on title, traditionally have required the plaintiff to plead the nub of the controversy, 
                                                                                                                 
 
 119. Grable & Sons Metal Prods., 545 U.S. at 315. 
 120. My esteemed colleague David Shapiro eloquently defends and praises the use of 
discretion in federal jurisdictional decision making, offering many examples at all stages of 
the judicial process. His praise extends to discretion on the part of district judges to decline 
jurisdiction “based on considerations of judicial administration and the degree of federal 
concern.” Shapiro, supra note 113, at 568. That article puts to one side, however, the 
questions of when discretion should be exercised, id. at 562 n.115, including questions 
concerning continuing review of jurisdictional issues. It is principally those issues that make 
me disfavor discretion in district court jurisdiction, even though it is fully appropriate at 
other stages, like Supreme Court decisions concerning which cases to review. 
 121. Grable & Sons Metal Prods., 545 U.S. at 313–14 (internal citations omitted). 
2013] REMOVAL REFORM 637 
 
so the disputed federal issue appeared on the well-pleaded complaint.122 Actually, 
the traditional rule had been codified in Michigan, so it was a statute that permitted 
and required the plaintiff to plead the federal question. Very few of the traditional 
causes of action require such pleading of the whole controversy; injunction may be 
the primary other example. But these cases do show that there is still some room 
for “turns on” jurisdiction to operate, if only in a small space. 
Justice Souter noticed that quiet title actions had traditionally been heard in 
federal courts,123 but it is not clear that he appreciated that the “turns on” category 
was practically limited to them. That is not because other actions do not reveal that 
federal law is pivotal, but only because they cannot show that from the well-
pleaded complaint alone. 
Grable itself was a comparatively easy case, because the state cause of action 
that required pleading the central federal issue was based upon traditional legal and 
equitable requirements. Indeed Grable could have invoked federal jurisdiction itself 
by asking for a federal declaratory judgment and stating that the alternative 
coercive action was quiet title, thus satisfying Skelly Oil’s requirement for 
declaratory judgment jurisdiction. Removal then would be proper because the case 
could originally have been brought in federal court; the removal and original 
jurisdiction would remain coterminous. 
The problem cases for “turns on” jurisdiction arise when a required state 
pleading shows a pivotal federal question that would not appear on the complaint 
under traditional common law pleading but that is appropriate now because state 
law has departed from common law requirements. Franchise Tax’s treatment of 
state declaratory judgment actions might suggest that all nontraditional state 
remedies will be precluded from expanding federal question jurisdiction, not only 
state declaratory judgments. Indeed Skelly Oil’s treatment of declaratory judgments 
might suggest that none but traditional categories would be consulted. If so, quiet 
title actions that turn on federal law seem almost the only cases that today can 
qualify for the tiny “turns on” category. But if instead state changes in pleading 
rules can make cases qualify for federal question jurisdiction, states could expand 
federal jurisdiction significantly. 
It is state rules that brought the federal issue onto the well-pleaded complaint in 
both Smith and Merrell Dow, among others. Another notable case in which state 
law made federal law central is Moore v. Chesapeake & Ohio Railway Company.124 
The state of Kentucky had copied federal rules that governed interstate railway 
workers (under the Federal Safety Appliance Acts) and applied them by statute to 
the state-regulated intrastate railway workers. Moore, an injured intrastate railway 
worker, sued under Kentucky law claiming that violation of the federal acts would 
constitute negligence per se under state law and would bar defenses of contributory 
                                                                                                                 
 
 122. See Hopkins v. Walker, 244 U.S. 486, 491 (1917); Wilson Cypress Co. v. Del Pozo 
y Marcos, 236 U.S. 635, 643–44 (1915); N. Pac. Ry. Co. v. Soderberg, 188 U.S. 526, 528 
(1903). 
 123. Grable & Sons Metal Prods., 545 U.S. at 315 (“This conclusion puts [the Court] in 
venerable company, quiet title actions having been the subject of some of the earliest 
exercises of federal-question jurisdiction over state-law claims.”). 
 124. 291 U.S. 205 (1934). 
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negligence and assumption of risk. The Supreme Court held that there was no 
jurisdiction in the federal district courts to hear the claim. 
Moore was decided not long after Smith, and commentators have long 
considered the two cases inconsistent. In fact, Justice Brennan in Merrell Dow 
called them irreconcilable and described Moore as a “sport.”125 He further said it 
had “long been in a state of innocuous desuetude” and “ought to be overruled.”126 
This issue of states having the ability, by their lawmaking, to confer federal 
court jurisdiction is central and important, but Grable and quiet title do not involve 
that issue and do not suggest the answer.127 
The reason quiet title actions may stand alone, unless state laws are permitted to 
move cases into federal jurisdiction, is that it is difficult to find other traditional 
actions that require the plaintiff to plead the nub of the controversy. Declaratory 
judgment actions have been eliminated by Skelly Oil because they are not 
“traditional”; a special rule has been adopted for them, jurisdiction is decided 
according to traditional coercive actions that could or would have been brought had 
there been no declaratory judgment. Injunctions also generally require pleading of 
the controversy, and Ex parte Young128 contains language suggesting that there was 
federal jurisdiction of that injunctive action because the case turned on federal 
law.129 If so, injunctions could be conceptualized like quiet title and contribute to 
the “turns on” test. (Moreover injunctive actions that turn on federal law are much 
more numerous than quiet title ones that do, and so would contribute many more 
cases to “turns on” jurisdiction.) But since 1908, when Young was decided, many 
have explained that decision, and its federal question jurisdiction, as a Court ruling 
that the Fourteenth Amendment creates a cause of action to enjoin state officials 
from unconstitutional conduct. (Section 1983, the Civil Rights Act, also creates a 
federal cause of action, but the Young Court did not advert to it, and the statute was 
not given much attention until the 1960s.) 
More recent cases provide further evidence that injunctions to enforce federal 
rights are not deemed to invoke “turns on” jurisdiction but rather reflect a “federal 
cause of action” test for jurisdiction. Injunctions to enforce the Constitution are 
allowed against both state and federal officers, but when an injunction is sought to 
enforce a federal statutory right, a central inquiry is whether the particular federal 
statute has created, or contemplates, a federal injunctive cause of action.130 Even 
actions for violation of federal law that § 1983 appears explicitly to allow against 
                                                                                                                 
 
 125. Merrell Dow Pharm. Inc. v. Thompson, 478 U.S. 804, 822 n.1 (1986). 
 126. Id. at 821–23 n.1 (Brennan, J., dissenting). I myself do not consider Moore to be a 
“sport.” I suggest later that it was correctly decided and indeed should not qualify for federal 
question jurisdiction even under the proposed reforms. See infra text accompanying note 
146. In addition, it may not satisfy the well pleaded complaint rule. 
 127. I later suggest that some of these cases would be appropriate for federal jurisdiction 
under a “turns on” test and that some would not, and I attempt to set out some appropriate 
dividing lines. See infra text accompanying notes 145–49. 
 128. Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908). 
 129. Id. at 144 (“The sufficiency of rates with reference to the Federal Constitution is a 
judicial question, and one over which Federal courts have jurisdiction by reason of its 
Federal nature.”). 
 130. See Cannon v. Univ. of Chi., 441 U.S. 677, 694 (1979). 
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state officials are permitted only by interpreting the particular federal statute 
claimed to be violated; if injunction does not fit with that statute’s scheme, the 
statute is considered silently to revoke the general § 1983 provision.131 Injunctions, 
therefore, no longer seem supportive of “turns on” jurisdiction, although they may 
have been at one time. 
The final modern case to be considered is Empire Healthchoice Assurance, Inc. 
v. McVeigh.132 That case shows that Supreme Court Justices still disagree 
concerning both federal question jurisdiction and federal common law, but it does 
not directly undermine Grable. Justice Ginsburg, writing for the Court, does 
describe Grable as exemplifying a “special and small category”133 and, again, a 
“slim category,”134 but she does not contradict its holding. The five justice majority 
simply thought the case turned on state rather than federal law, and believed in 
addition that federal common law should not be created to govern the case. 
In McVeigh, the federal government had contracted with Blue Cross to provide a 
nationwide health plan for federal employees.135 The plan was administered by 
local companies, and Empire was the administrator for New York State.136 The 
contract provided that Empire should make a reasonable effort to recover amounts 
paid out in benefits, and employees were told they must reimburse the Company 
for benefits if they recover damages for their injury. 
Joseph McVeigh was involved in an accident and received medical benefits 
through Empire. He later died, and his administratrix, Denise McVeigh, filed a suit 
in state court (without any assistance from Empire) against the alleged tortfeasors 
who caused the injury. The suit ended in a settlement.137 Empire then sued in 
federal court to recover the medical benefits it had paid for McVeigh, but the 
Company refused to offset the amount it sought by deducting the litigation 
expenses McVeigh had incurred in procuring the settlement.138 Whether such an 
offset was appropriate appears to be the central issue on the merits. The district 
court did not reach the merits but dismissed for want of federal jurisdiction.139 The 
Second Circuit affirmed,140 and the Supreme Court agreed in a 5–4 opinion.141 
Both Empire and the United States as amicus curiae attempted to stretch Grable 
to allow jurisdiction any time “a federal element” was present on the well-pleaded 
complaint.142 That, however, is not the appropriate test. The Court may have 
                                                                                                                 
 
 131. See, e.g., Middlesex Cnty. Sewerage Auth. v. Nat’l Sea Clammers Ass’n, 453 U.S. 1 
(1981). 
 132. 547 U.S. 677 (2006). 
 133. Id. at 699. 
 134. Id. at 701. 
 135. See id. at 682. 
 136. See id. at 687. 
 137. See id. 
 138. See id. at 687–88. 
 139. Id. at 688. 
 140. Id. at 688–89. 
 141. See id. at 701. 
 142. That test is closer to the “original ingredient” view of federal jurisdiction, which 
describes the scope of constitutional federal question jurisdiction. In the early days of 
statutory federal question jurisdiction, the statute and the Constitution were called 
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broadened what has to appear on the complaint to include pivotal questions of 
federal law as well as federal causes of action, but that does not mean that “any 
federal element” is sufficient for jurisdiction.143 
The lesson of our trip through this extremely complicated jurisprudence is that 
the universe of cases in which the well-pleaded complaint (other than a declaratory 
judgment complaint) reveals that the controversy “turns on” federal law is not an 
entirely empty one. But the federal question cases in that universe are few and far 
between, making unnecessary, discretionary jurisdictional rules that can disrupt a 
litigation in its final hours. Although at least Grable falls within federal jurisdiction 
under the “turns on” test, the vast majority of cases that turn on federal law still 
cannot get into federal court on that basis. It remains unclear whether state causes 
of action that do not comport with traditional causes of action will be permitted to 
place controversies in federal court, on removal or originally, by requiring the 
plaintiff to set forth the whole controversy or by requiring the plaintiff to plead 
federal issues that are embedded in substantive state law. 
D. Current Requirements for General Federal Question Jurisdiction: A Summary 
The current criteria for general federal question jurisdiction (§ 1331), which 
preceded even Franchise Tax and Grable, as simply stated as possible, are: 
 
General federal question jurisdiction exists: 
 
(1)  when there is a federal cause of action, other than an action for a declaratory 
judgment; 
 
(2)  in the rare case that does not involve a qualifying federal cause of action but 
in which a pivotal question of federal law nonetheless appears on the face of 
a well-pleaded complaint (other than a declaratory judgment complaint); or 
 
(3)  when a state cause of action, sued on in state court, is “clearly preempted” 
by federal law and the case is removed by the defendant. 
 
Those are the three basic rules. In addition, there is special provision for 
declaratory judgments: 
 
                                                                                                                 
coextensive, but it has since been accepted that the statutory grant is far narrower than what 
the Constitution would permit. 
 143. Empire Healthchoice, 547 U.S. at 701 (“In sum, Grable emphasized that it takes 
more than a federal element ‘to open the “arising under” door.’ This case cannot be squeezed 
into the slim category Grable exemplifies.” (internal citations omitted)). The arguments for 
jurisdiction on other bases were stronger: (1) the argument that four Justices supported that 
federal common law should govern the entire controversy, or at least the controlling issues; 
and (2) the position of Empire and the United States that federal law preempted the 
controversy so that it fell within the subcategory of federal cause of action concerning 
federal preemption. Neither argument convinced the Court majority, which held that carriers 
seeking reimbursement had no right to sue in federal court. Id. 
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(4)  A declaratory judgment merits federal question jurisdiction when the 
coercive action that would otherwise have been brought would have 
qualified for federal question jurisdiction. 
 
And finally, the new Franchise Tax-Merrell Dow-Grable twist:  
 
(5)  In the second category above, the Supreme Court and lower courts may 
exercise discretion to dismiss from federal court cases that otherwise would 
be included. The content of the allowable discretion is still evolving and 
remains unclear; to date, the definition and features of that discretion differ 
from one Supreme Court decision to another. Grable, most recently, frames 
it as an “actually disputed and substantial”144 federal issue that will not 
overburden the federal courts. 
 Franchise Tax shows that discretion is also appropriate in declaratory 
judgment cases that are removed because the defendant could bring a 
coercive federal action against the plaintiff. 
E. How Changing the Removal Rules Can Help: The Resulting Criteria for 
Jurisdiction 
Even if Skelly Oil and all the existing case law remains, allowing the parties to 
remove based on what the initial pleadings disclose, when the case at that stage 
meets the tests for federal question jurisdiction, would admit some cases that would 
not otherwise qualify for federal jurisdiction. It would admit to federal court a 
significant number of cases that “turn on federal law”145 and that functionally 
belong in the federal question jurisdiction. Cases like Duke Power, and even 
Mottley, involve only federal issues—important ones in Duke Power—and yet are 
not eligible for federal question jurisdiction under conventional interpretation of 
current federal rules. The proposed changes would thus make the “turns on” 
category a sensible and significant category of federal question jurisdiction. It 
would include not only some state causes of action with embedded federal elements 
but also cases in which the pivotal federal issue arises in defense. 
Even if the proposed removal reforms were enacted, the statement describing 
federal jurisdiction would not be as simple and precise as one might desire. Yet the 
system would be both clearer and more logical than the rules it replaces. 
The tests for original federal question jurisdiction could have only two parts 
instead of three, and statements (4) and (5) could be eliminated. The new 
descriptive statement would read: 
 There is original federal question jurisdiction when (1) the well-
pleaded complaint reveals a federal cause of action (created either by 
                                                                                                                 
 
 144. Grable & Sons Metal Prods., Inc. v. Darue Eng’g & Mfg., 545 U.S. 308, 314 (2005). 
 145. Most examples involve a state cause of action that incorporates federal law. There 
may be a few cases in which the pleading rules require a plaintiff to plead enough to show 
that the controversy turns on, or is likely to turn on, federal law. See, e.g., Smith v. Kan. City 
Title & Trust Co., 255 U.S. 180 (1921). Such state pleading requirements are often the 
subject of efforts to remove a case from state to federal court. 
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positive federal law or by the traditional common law forms of action). 
The declaratory judgment procedure does not count as a federal cause 
of action for purposes of this rule. (2) There also is jurisdiction when a 
case is likely to turn on federal law. Appropriate pleading of a 
declaratory judgment action can be considered, in its own right, in 
determining whether a case is likely to turn on federal law. 
 There is removal jurisdiction (1) by the defendant when the plaintiff 
could have brought the case originally in federal court but did not; or 
(2) by any party when the pleadings reveal that the case is likely to turn 
upon federal law. 
The third part of the rule that exists today—that a defendant can remove when 
the plaintiff’s cause of action, sued upon in state court, is “clearly preempted” by 
federal law—would not need to be separately stated. It could be conceptualized as a 
subset of the federal cause of action rule, as I have considered it earlier. But it 
would also fall within the “turns on” federal law category, which would now be a 
genuine part of federal question jurisdiction. 
Similarly the fourth part of today’s rule, stating a special procedure for 
declaratory judgment actions, would not be necessary; declaratory judgment 
actions would be covered by the second part of the new rule. 
Supreme Court and other federal court discretion would be replaced by a further 
refinement of the “turns on” rule that removes from its scope certain identifiable 
categories of cases and reserves “turns on” jurisdiction for cases most appropriate 
to the federal forum. 
Devising a fully rational federal question jurisdiction is beyond the scope of this 
Article. To dispose of the current quagmire, further work will need to be done. The 
chief concern will be defining appropriate and easily administrable contours for the 
“turns on” test and deciding whether to apply it broadly or narrowly. These are the 
same issues currently being considered concerning the preemption category of 
federal question jurisdiction. Appropriate contours can become apparent over time 
through case by case decision making. 
Two important issues for “turns on” jurisdiction are (1) how likely it must be 
that federal law is controlling and (2) whether it must be a controlling issue or the 
controlling one. If a strict approach were taken on these questions, as I suggest 
would be appropriate at least as a starting point, that might eliminate Merrell Dow 
and Moore from original federal jurisdiction. Empire Health was in fact eliminated 
because the Court majority was not convinced that the case would or should turn on 
federal law, although federal interests were involved in the case. 
Obviously some leeway would have to be given to mispredictions by the district 
judge, who initially would have to decide the probability of pivotal federal issues 
simply from the pleadings. If the case developed differently, and the federal issues 
fell out of the case early, the district judge would have discretion to leave state 
issues to a state tribunal.146 
                                                                                                                 
 
 146. See United Mine Workers of Am. v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 726 (1966) (“That power 
need not be exercised in every case in which it is found to exist. It has consistently been 
recognized that pendent jurisdiction is a doctrine of discretion, not of plaintiff's right. . . . 
Certainly, if the federal claims are dismissed before trial, even though not insubstantial in a 
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These factors focus on the importance of the federal issue to the particular case, 
demanding that it appear from the pleadings that it is very likely to be dispositive. 
If so, the case would raise a “substantial” federal question and would “arise under” 
federal law for purposes of § 1331. There would be no assessment of the 
importance of the issue in other respects; nor would a court speculate about the 
number of cases that will raise the same or comparable issues. Courts would not 
exercise general discretion about whether to admit a “turns on” case to federal 
district court. 
It also will be important to create exceptions to the “turns on” rule. Franchise 
Tax can be interpreted to create one such exception. According to my 
interpretation, the Court essentially ruled that it did not like the way the Edelmann 
rule works out in state-initiated, state-declaratory proceedings, even though the 
Court supported that rule for the general run of cases. It therefore adopted the rule 
but made an exception for state-initiated declaratory proceedings first filed in state 
court.147 
Whether or not one agrees that comity required that abdication of jurisdiction, 
the deference to states does not seem to harm jurisdictional policy, though it takes 
from lower federal courts a particular determinative federal issue. The category 
excepted is clear and easy to apply; in that sense, the criteria for “discretion” in 
Franchise Tax, if they were better spelled out, would be much more satisfactory 
than those in Merrell Dow and Grable. Moreover the cases Franchise Tax excepts 
from original jurisdiction, and Franchise Tax in particular, are not the kind of 
litigation that is likely to be lost or overlooked when the losing party seeks 
Supreme Court review. If the state courts in Franchise Tax upheld their tax 
assessments despite the serious and important argument that ERISA disallows 
them, the federal issue would be conspicuous in a petition for review, and the 
Supreme Court would have authority to decide it at that point. 
Beyond any current exceptions from “turns on” jurisdiction, courts should look 
for categories of cases that both can be clearly defined and that are appropriate for 
exclusion. Undoubtedly, as experience is gained with applying the “turns on” test, 
further categories of cases that do not require original federal jurisdiction will 
become evident and can be omitted from federal jurisdiction. 
Some exceptions have already been suggested. Probably the controlling federal 
issue should be required to be a substantive rather than a procedural one. The ALI 
suggested several more specific categories of federal defenses that should not be 
subject to removal, in order to prevent overuse and abuse of the process. One 
example is a claim that a judgment from another state or from a federal court bars a 
state proceeding; another is that a particular state’s law must under the U.S. 
Constitution be the rule of decision; others are defenses that one cannot 
constitutionally be subjected to jurisdiction by the particular state court.148 Such 
exceptions are necessary to keep the jurisdiction within reasonable contours. The 
more specific and clear the exclusions are, the fewer problems they will cause the 
new jurisdiction. 
                                                                                                                 
jurisdictional sense, the state claims should be dismissed as well.”). 
 147. See supra text accompanying notes 92–93. 
 148. See AM. LAW INST., supra note 4, at 193–94. 
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Another very important limit that should be adopted to create a workable “turns 
on” test is a requirement that there be a direct federal interest in providing an 
answer to the controlling federal question. Some such limit is necessary to prevent 
state legislatures’ choices of pleading and substantive rules to control and over-
expand federal jurisdiction. Therefore when a state adopts federal law simply for 
state convenience in filling out its own law, and federal law does not apply of its 
own force to the transaction at issue, it should not serve, through the “turns on” 
test, to transfer state litigation to federal courts. Without such a limitation, the 
“turns on” category could become boundless. The requirement of a direct federal 
interest, further explained below, also would exclude from federal jurisdiction most 
of the cases that have caused the justices to feel the need for discretion to limit the 
jurisdiction. 
The suggested category for exclusion is not an amorphous one, even though the 
term “direct federal interest” may be. What should be required is that the 
controlling federal law that gives jurisdiction apply, of its own force, to the 
controversy or transaction at issue, even if that federal law does not include a 
federal cause of action. It is fairly easy to see in which pile a controversy falls. In 
Smith, Merrell Dow, and Grable the central federal law did apply, of its own force, 
to the controversy and the transaction at stake, even though there was no federal 
cause of action. If, as was alleged, the bonds that were challenged in Smith were 
inconsistent with the U.S. Constitution, federal law did forbid them, even if it did 
not create a federal cause of action. Federal law applied to and regulated the 
branding of the drug in Merrell Dow; it decided whether the sale it made in Grable 
was effectual or not, even if there was no federal cause of action. When federal law 
regulates directly in that way and that same federal law is dispositive of the case, 
the case would be eligible for “turns on” jurisdiction, under the proposed approach. 
Just as “direct” can be a vague and unhelpful term, so can “of its own force.” 
When Holmes insisted on the exclusiveness of the federal cause of action as the test 
for federal jurisdiction, he said, “the law must create at least a part of the cause of 
action by its own force, for it is the suit, not a question in the suit, that must arise 
under the law of the United States.”149 To him the law did not apply “of its own 
force” unless a federal remedy allowed the particular litigation to be brought. I am 
using “of its own force” in a broader sense, not requiring a federal cause of action, 
but requiring that federal law, standing alone, would determine the legality or 
illegality of the matter at issue. It would apply to the controversy, even without 
state law incorporating it or referring to it in its own law. 
On the other hand, if a state copies federal income tax law to use as the state’s 
income tax code, it should not be able thereby to have litigation turning on the 
meaning of that code transferred to the original federal jurisdiction.150 If the 
controversy does end up turning on the incorporated federal law, the Supreme 
Court can review the state courts’ results if it wishes, but there is neither original 
                                                                                                                 
 
 149. Smith, 255 U.S. at 215 (Holmes, J., dissenting). 
 150. This is probably the distinction the Merrell Dow Court was making in its footnote 
12. See Merrell Dow Pharm. Inc. v. Thompson, 478 U.S. 804, 814 n.12 (1986) (“In Moore, 
in contrast, the Court emphasized that the violation of the federal standard as an element of 
state tort recovery did not fundamentally change the state tort nature of the action.”). 
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nor compulsory jurisdiction. On this basis, Moore would be excluded from federal 
original jurisdiction (as it was), even after adoption of the proposed reforms. 
III. DIVERSITY JURISDICTION AND FORUM SHOPPING 
The second context in which to examine the effect of changing removal 
provisions involves particularly cases that fall within the federal diversity 
jurisdiction, 28 U.S.C. § 1332. State courts also have concurrent jurisdiction of 
diversity cases, and in the first instance, at least, a plaintiff can pick a state or 
federal forum. If he chooses the federal court, the case will be tried there. If he 
chooses a state court that has jurisdiction (the place where the accident occurred, 
for example, or the plaintiff’s residence), the defendant has the option to remove to 
federal court. However under current law, if the plaintiff chooses the defendant’s 
home state the defendant has no opportunity to select federal court, and the 
plaintiff’s choice will prevail. 
This situation exists because of explicit provisions in 28 U.S.C. § 1441—
defendants have a right to remove if the plaintiff could have brought the case in 
federal court instead of the state court he has chosen. But defendants lose that right 
if the plaintiff brings the suit in the any of the defendants’ home states. 
The reason for this limitation on removal is fairly self-evident. The presumed 
reason for giving federal courts jurisdiction over cases usually involving primarily 
state law is the danger that a state court may be biased, especially in favor of its 
own citizen.151 When a citizen is sued in her own state, there is little likelihood of 
state court bias against her because of her statehood, so there is little need to allow 
her to remove to federal court. The plaintiff has chosen the particular state forum, 
so it is unnecessary to consider any possibilities for bias against him. Accordingly 
the possibility of bias does not warrant intruding upon the limited resources of 
federal courts. 
This analysis suggests it would not be worth extending the opportunity to 
remove to a defendant sued in her home state. But when one looks beyond the 
assumed primary purpose of federal diversity jurisdiction to other effects that 
nonsymmetrical removal can have, it is less clear that § 1441(b) adopts the correct 
policy. 
The proposed change in diversity removal would take away the plaintiff’s ability 
to pin the defendant into state court by suing the defendant in her own state. The 
problem with giving plaintiffs more choices of forum for the lawsuit than 
defendants has long been noticed by the courts. It also has long been recognized to 
exist primarily when there is a large difference between the systems that have 
concurrent jurisdiction and especially when their laws are likely to yield different 
results in the litigation. 
If courts are thought to differ between themselves, even in the substantive law 
they apply, plaintiffs may easily attempt to control which substantive law is applied 
by picking the forum in which the applicable law appears most favorable to him. 
Even if the court has no bias toward the defendant, indeed even if the judge is 
                                                                                                                 
 
 151. Contra Henry J. Friendly, The Historic Basis of Diversity Jurisdiction, 41 HARV. L. 
REV. 483 (1928). 
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favorably inclined toward her, when the law is unfavorable to her position as 
compared to federal law or the law of other states, the plaintiff’s ability to select 
that law without her input can place her at a disadvantage. The defendant will be 
unable to remove even though the plaintiff’s reason for choosing her home state is 
because her state’s law (or its mode of applying a shared law) is peculiarly 
favorable to the plaintiff. 
Hence the plaintiff has strategic choices that are not available to the defendant, 
and if there are differences in the law to be applied in the various available fora, 
there can be both serious disadvantage and unfairness to the defendant.152 
Symmetrical access to federal court for both plaintiff and defendant would reduce 
forum shopping and unfairness, and for that reason should be seriously considered, 
even though it may not be necessary to prevent state court bias against its resident. 
By symmetrical access I mean that both parties should have identical opportunities 
to access federal jurisdiction in each case. 
A. The Persistent Problem of Forum Shopping 
Since at least the late nineteenth century, the Supreme Court has been deeply 
concerned with federal-state forum shopping—that is, picking between the federal 
and state courts that coexist within each jurisdiction in order to alter the outcome of 
a case. The forum shopping and jurisdictional schemes we have had typically have 
given nonsymmetrical opportunities for access to plaintiffs and defendants. 
In Swift v. Tyson153 in 1842, Mr. Justice Story ruled that “general federal 
common law” would apply, especially in areas of commercial and contract law. 
The rule applied as long as (1) states had not passed statutes controlling a subject, 
and (2) the subject did not concern strictly local matters, such as real estate. Story’s 
reason for adopting the federal common law approach, somewhat ironically, was to 
increase uniformity and avoid variation by state. I say ironically because when 
Swift was overruled ninety-six years later—in Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins,154 a 
case in which its continuing validity had not been questioned, criticized, or 
argued—the central attack was that it made impossible uniform outcomes between 
state and federal courts.  
Erie’s criticism of Swift was well taken, because under the Swift regime state 
courts followed state decisional law across the board, whereas federal courts 
respected it only if it involved immovables or some other very localized matter. It 
was not unusual therefore for each jurisdiction to apply a different substantive law 
to a transaction. The national uniformity that Story had anticipated concerning 
subjects like contracts and commercial law had not developed. 
The Swift rule had always paid deference to state statutes, ignoring only state 
decisional law or common law. When there were statutes, local state and federal 
decisions were similar; therefore, there would be “vertical” similarity between state 
                                                                                                                 
 
 152. Such disadvantage and unfairness will not by any means exist in every case in which 
the plaintiff chooses to litigate in the defendant’s home state. The difference in law may be 
negligible and the plaintiff may have other reasons for choosing state court—reasons the 
defendant may or may not share. 
 153. 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 1 (1842). 
 154. 304 U.S. 64 (1938). 
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and federal courts (although there still would be little nationwide similarity, 
sometimes called “horizontal” similarity, either between states or between federal 
courts). As long as no state statute or local rule governed, federal courts could be 
uniform among themselves on (federal) common law issues, but the various state 
courts continued to decide upon their common law rules for themselves, neither 
necessarily following each other’s decisions nor following federal decisions. 
Accordingly there could be horizontal (federal) but not vertical (federal-state) 
uniformity. 
It is curious that Story could have thought that Swift would produce uniformity, 
when failure to do so was a main criticism hurled at it in Erie. But Story apparently 
had believed that the Supreme Court would lead by persuasive force, as it 
interpreted general common law in a variety of subject matter areas; the states 
would choose to follow the Court’s precedents because of the quality of Supreme 
Court reasoning and because of the Justices’ prestige. Whereas Professor Crosskey 
believes the common law should have been enforced against the states,155 Story had 
not anticipated that this would be necessary. 
One reason Story’s prognosis of uniformity could not come to pass is that more 
and more state statutes were enacted, subject to deference under Swift’s rule. 
Statutes were especially prevalent in the commercial arena, where uniformity was 
deemed particularly important. 
Moreover, whatever persuasive force the Supreme Court might have been able 
to exert over state judiciaries on common law matters was reduced when the Court 
stopped hearing many of these common law questions in favor of other subjects. 
In Erie, Brandeis’s central criticism of Swift was this lack of uniformity that the 
Swift system caused—to the point that persons, for example parties to a contract, 
could not know which rules would govern their behavior until they knew which 
court, state or federal, would hear their case.156 Moreover, they were often not in 
control of the variables that would put them in the federal arena or keep them 
outside of it, so reasonable planning with an eye to the applicable law was not 
possible. 
Brandeis was concerned not just about the confusion and irrationality of the 
system, but also about its unfairness. Some of the “mischievous results” Brandeis 
saw concerned:  
grave discrimination by non-citizens against citizens. [Swift] made 
rights enjoyed under the unwritten “general law” vary according to 
whether enforcement was sought in the state or in the federal court; and 
the privilege of selecting the court in which the right should be 
determined was conferred upon the non-citizen. Thus, the doctrine 
rendered impossible equal protection of the law. . . . The discrimination 
resulting became in practice far-reaching.157 
                                                                                                                 
 
 155. II WILLIAM WINSLOW CROSSKEY, POLITICS AND THE CONSTITUTION IN THE HISTORY 
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It was largely in order to halt this unfairness that the Swift system was declared 
unconstitutional and the rule of Erie took its place. As with Swift, the principal 
purpose of Erie was to make possible federal-state uniformity, especially in 
diversity litigation. And like Swift, Erie has failed at this task.158 Despite Brandeis’s 
intentions when he authored Erie, absence of uniformity, and resultant possibilities 
for forum shopping by those with the most control over which court to select, have 
been the result of Erie’s system. Various factors have contributed: a key reason, for 
example, is the substance-procedure distinction, and the rule that the forum may 
apply its own doctrines if they count as “procedural,” even if they may affect the 
outcome of the case.159 
Erie did not decide whether state and federal courts would also differ 
concerning which state’s law should apply. Erie made clear that state law is to rule 
in federal as well as state court, but it did not indicate which state’s law would 
control, or even which system the federal courts would follow to ascertain which 
law controlled a case involving diverse parties. Three years later, however, in 
Klaxon Co. v. Stentor Electric Manufacturing Co.,160 the Supreme Court adopted 
the system that has remained with us ever since. 
The current system attempts to guarantee that the state and federal courts in one 
jurisdiction will both turn to the same state’s substantive law. Klaxon instructed the 
federal court to apply the same conflict of laws rule (the rule choosing which law to 
apply) as the rule used by the state court in its jurisdiction. The theory was that if 
both were to apply the same conflicts rule in the same fashion, then both the state 
and federal court in that jurisdiction would be applying the same substantive rules. 
(Of course, flexible conflicts rules might still be applied differently by different 
courts.) 
But there is a fundamental problem with this system—more than one state is, by 
hypothesis, involved in a diversity case, so the plaintiff almost always has the 
choice of at least one other state in which he can sue. In another state (whether he 
goes to state or federal court), he will potentially acquire an entirely different 
choice-of-law approach, which will send him to an entirely different state’s 
substantive law. Because the plaintiff can select the jurisdiction in which the suit is 
to take place, and hence the choice-of-law rule that will apply, he may (if he is far-
sighted enough) greatly affect even the applicable substantive law, to the detriment 
of the defendant.161 
Erie was prevented from achieving the uniformity it sought, therefore, both by 
the substance-procedure dichotomy, which led to federal-state divergences, and by 
the Klaxon holding, which led to forum shopping between federal courts and 
                                                                                                                 
 
 158. See Richard D. Freer, Erie’s Mid-Life Crisis, 63 TUL. L. REV. 1087, 1141–42 (1989). 
 159. In the context of Erie, and the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the federal courts 
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 160. 313 U.S. 487 (1941). 
 161. See, e.g., Ferens v. John Deere Co., 494 U.S. 516 (1990). 
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between courts of different states. Any “grave discrimination by non-citizens 
against citizens” because of citizens’ lesser strategic choices—the primary policy 
problem with the Swift regime according to Brandeis162—continued unabated by 
the Erie doctrine’s acceptance. It is true that for Brandeis the concern was between 
differences in state and federal courts, but the “unfairness” he describes is precisely 
the same when the manipulation is achieved by a change in state jurisdiction rather 
than a change from state to federal jurisdiction. 
The most apparent alternative to Klaxon’s deference to the conflicts law of the 
state in which the federal district court is located was creation of a federal common 
law conflicts rule that all federal courts would follow. That rule would tell federal 
judges which state law to choose in which circumstances to govern interstate 
controversies, so that any federal court in theory would find applicable the same 
state substantive law. 
That alternative approach could have better served the cause of uniformity and 
the defeat of forum shopping. A federal rule could have resulted at least in 
uniformity between federal courts. But even if all federal courts applied the same 
test or principle to lead to the same applicable substantive law, the federal courts 
might be applying different rules from those of the state courts within their 
jurisdictions, the problem Erie sought to prevent. 
Especially as things have evolved since Klaxon, including the fact that travel 
from one jurisdiction to another has become commonplace for lawyers and 
businesses, Klaxon leaves the opportunity for interstate forum shopping open for 
exploitation. That is especially troubling when there is a large difference between 
the relevant states’ conflicts or substantive rules. If, instead, there were one federal 
conflicts doctrine, it is not unlikely that some, even many, states might decide to 
follow the federal approach. One reason is that conflict of laws jurisprudence 
remains relatively underdeveloped. The alternative to following the federal 
approach would be, for some states, to cherish a few private precedents that are not 
of sufficient frequency or breadth to give guidance concerning the whole body of 
doctrine and the range of conflicts problems that can arise. The persuasive force 
that was not sufficient for the Court to lead the nation in commercial and other 
more general fields of law, as Story had hoped in Swift, might have been more 
effective, and indeed might still be, if the federal courts were to attempt to develop 
conflict of laws alone as a federal common law field. 
While Klaxon had its supporters,163 most commentators have believed it was a 
missed opportunity to strike a blow at forum shopping and that a federal choice of 
law rule, imposed by Congress if not by the Supreme Court, would be the wisest 
course. Nonetheless this result did not carry. A principal reason for ambivalence 
toward reform was a fear that a federal choice-of-law rule adopted out of a desire 
for consistency and uniformity might revert to the “old-fashioned” type of conflicts 
rules—like the place of the wrong is the jurisdiction whose rules govern a tort, the 
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place of the making of a contract is the law that governs a contract, the place where 
the marriage was performed is the law that governs the legality of the marriage, and 
so on.164 Most scholars since at least the 1960s have preferred “interest analysis” to 
such seemingly clear-cut rules.165 
Many feared that interest analysis might not be the chosen approach because it is 
more uncertain and amorphous; it requires analyzing the interests of all relevant 
states in the transaction the litigation concerns. Some also feared statutory adoption 
of some version of interest analysis other than the particular one to which they had 
devoted all of their scholarly energies. Many different and interesting wrinkles had 
been added to the analysis first put forward by Brainerd Currie166 and much 
discussed and developed since. 
In fact, Congress could have enacted a statute that should have been perfectly 
satisfactory to the interest analysis scholars, simply instructing federal courts to 
apply a federal choice of law rule and to base that rule upon interest analysis, 
leaving the courts to work out over time the details of the doctrine in practice. 
Instead, however, no legislation was forthcoming. The Klaxon rule continued in 
force, and each jurisdiction continued sporadically to develop its rules—some 
following interest analysis, in several different forms, and others applying 
traditional classical approaches involving classification of cases (tort, contract, etc.) 
and clear rules.167 Few jurisdictions have sufficient cases to develop fully their own 
version of interest analysis, even when that is the path they choose for their conflict 
of laws doctrine. 
B. How Changing Federal Court Access Could Help 
If it were a priority to get rid of forum shopping, of plaintiff advantage in 
choosing the law, and, most important, of uncertainty concerning which law will 
control a planned transaction, these goals could surely be accomplished. They 
would require, first, the overturning of Klaxon, by either the Supreme Court or by 
Congress,168 so that all federal courts (and perhaps other courts) would be 
following the same choice-of-law approach. But such a reform would also require 
change in current provisions so that the defendant can remove and have access to 
federal court on par with the plaintiff; she could no longer be pinned into her home 
state. 
                                                                                                                 
 
 164. See generally RESTATEMENT OF THE LAW OF CONFLICT OF LAW 377, 395 (1934). 
 165. See Cavers, supra note 163; see also Brainerd Currie, Change of Venue and the 
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In fact, the problem of forum shopping implicates removal even more than it 
does choice of law. The discrepancy in favor of plaintiffs that Brandeis complained 
of in Erie was a function not of choice of law under Swift, but of the removal rule’s 
refusal to let defendants choose federal court on par with the plaintiffs. Reforming 
removal so as to make the parties’ choices symmetrical (to always give both parties 
the same choices) would more directly balance the scales between them, and at 
least as important, would leave each with a law—the federal law—to count on, 
because it would be within each party’s ability to make that be the applicable rule. 
Removing the longstanding discrimination is thus attainable, if that is the 
paramount priority. It could be accomplished by both overturning Klaxon and 
changing the provision prohibiting removal by a defendant sued in her own state 
under § 1332. The difficult question is whether any ill effects of such a change—
such as more cases in federal court, and unnecessarily, if state court bias is the 
yardstick—would be outweighed by the more successful resolution of Brandeis’s 
concerns about fairness. 
Not only could overturning Klaxon and changing the removal rule affect forum 
shopping, fairness between the parties, and ability to know what law will govern 
particular transactions; the difficulties now experienced because of the substantive-
procedure dichotomy and its rules would disappear as well. Because all could rely 
on the ability to go to federal court (as long as they could rely on the lawsuit being 
diverse), it would be within their power to opt for federal procedures as well as 
federal substantive rules. Even in instances where the federal rules are not the rules 
one would prefer on the merits, there is an advantage in being able to know what 
law will apply absent unanimous consent to an alternative. 
Does this proposal for removing “grave discrimination by non-citizens against 
citizens”169 really warrant allowing defendants to remove from their own state? 
Despite Brandeis’s statement that such imbalance in selecting the forum “rendered 
impossible equal protection of the law,”170 surely it does not violate the Equal 
Protection Clause in any literal sense. The real issue is how important Brandeis’s 
concerns are, in how many cases they arise, and how those concerns should weigh 
against a reluctance to increase federal dockets. Finally it is an open question how 
great an increase the change would entail. 
Another final factor relevant to whether the advantages of such a proposal are 
worth its costs is a recognition that, even with the proposed change, the unfairness 
problem with forum shopping would not be entirely solved. Persons could rely 
upon federal law applying, absent unanimous consent to an alternative, but only if 
they could reliably predict that the case would satisfy the requirements for the 
federal diversity jurisdiction (or another category of federal jurisdiction). Even 
when a prediction concerning the jurisdictional amount seems reliable, a plaintiff 
still could engage in strategic and other choices to pin a defendant into state court. 
For example, complete diversity is required for the diversity jurisdiction, not by the 
Constitution but by Supreme Court interpretation of the diversity statute.171 In 
structuring the lawsuit, the plaintiff may have choices about how many and which 
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parties to include as defendants, and could therefore avoid the possibility of 
removal to federal court by adding as a defendant a person from the plaintiff’s own 
state. Accordingly, the proposal would cut back significantly on plaintiff’s greater 
opportunities to control the choice of forum (and potentially of applicable law), but 
it would not avoid the problem in every case. 
A different reason, however, favors adopting the proposed change in removal 
rules. This advantage, while little discussed, could be just as important as the 
unfairness and “grave discrimination” between noncitizens and citizens that 
worried Brandeis.172 This reason for favoring the change is the difference it could 
make in concurrent litigation of the same matter in state and federal court—under 
the diversity and/or the federal question jurisdiction. The grave problems that exist 
with our current policies concerning concurrent litigation, and the benefits that 
changing the removal rules would create, is the subject of the next Part of this 
Article. 
IV. CONCURRENT FEDERAL-STATE JURISDICTION 
One of the strangest aspects of our jurisdictional system is the set of rules that 
have come to govern duplicative, concurrent, in personam jurisdiction.173 These 
rules apply both in diversity and in federal question cases. The problem arises when 
a plaintiff who has the option of going to federal court instead sues in state court in 
a manner that does not allow the defendant to remove. One common example 
would arise in a case that qualifies for federal diversity jurisdiction except the 
plaintiff has sued the defendant in her home state, thus preventing her from 
removing to federal court. In a federal question case, the plaintiff may have sued on 
a contract when he could have sued on a federal cause of action; or he may himself 
have had no choice about forum, because the federal issues in the case arise only in 
defense and/or reply, as in Louisville & Nashville Railroad Co. v. Mottley.174 
In all these examples, the defendant is defending in state court a suit she would 
prefer to have in federal court but that she is unable to remove.175 Under our current 
                                                                                                                 
 
 172. In federal question cases as well as diversity cases, one party—the plaintiff—often 
has an advantage over the other in choosing or avoiding a federal forum. Because the 
plaintiff is the drafter and the master of the well-pleaded complaint, and it is that document 
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system, believe it or not, the state defendant is permitted to herself bring essentially 
the same dispute to federal court in a separate lawsuit, though not by removal, and, 
if you believe what you read, the federal court has a “virtually unflagging 
obligation . . . to exercise the jurisdiction given [it]”176 even in concurrent, in 
personam cases. In addition, “the circumstances permitting the dismissal of a 
federal suit due to the presence of a concurrent state proceeding for reasons of wise 
judicial administration are considerably more limited than the circumstances 
appropriate for abstention.”177 
The Supreme Court so stated in 1976 in Colorado River Water Conservation 
District v. United States.178 Granted, the Court there found that such circumstances 
do sometimes exist.179 It in fact abstained to avoid duplication on the facts of the 
case before it, dismissing the federal suit.180 The case involved Colorado’s system 
for rationing water, a continuing scheme involving litigation in several Colorado 
districts.181 The United States was a defendant in some of those cases, due to its 
consent to suit in state court in such circumstances in the McCarran Amendment.182 
The Court’s rationale for deferring to ongoing state proceedings essentially was 
that interference with the state’s complex project by adding in federal court 
litigation was unnecessary and unwise.183 Insofar as the Court did state an 
unusually strong case for noninterference, the holding may still be consistent with 
the Court’s invocation of a strong presumption against staying federal proceedings 
and for a federal duty to adjudicate. 
Despite the disposition of the particular case, the rule thus appeared to be that 
the federal court need not, and usually should not, defer even to a duplicative state 
proceeding that has been filed before the federal action. (Later I will discuss the 
current status of the rule on deference and its nuances.) Moreover, it is up to each 
state to determine what to do when an earlier-filed but not completed federal suit is 
addressing the same problems as a state case, or even substantially duplicates the 
state case in parties and claims. It may either defer or continue. Each state may 
have a consistent policy, usually articulated by its legislature or its courts, or its 
courts may make the judgment in an ad hoc fashion. 
Both state and federal proceedings therefore may continue, no matter how 
duplicative they are. Two trials may proceed, even if both are complex, expensive, 
and lengthy. But if they come out inconsistently both cannot control. Which should, 
or will? 
In our system the first decision that is final controls. In fact, the other 
proceeding should stop once one decision is final, because the final one can make 
irrelevant whatever follows, through res judicata and other doctrines. But there is 
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more to it than that; federal courts’ jurisprudence would not rest with such a simple 
resolution. 
Two issues have been central: What does “final” mean, and which system will 
define it? The resolution has been that federal law defines finality for federal cases 
(at least for federal question cases, compare Semtek,184 discussed below) but that 
state law controls when its litigation is “final” and thus subject to res judicata effect 
in state and federal court. (It probably would be impermissible for a state to adopt a 
different definition of finality when the issue is res judicata vis-à- vis a pending 
federal proceeding than when it is vis-à-vis a state proceeding, because a state is 
not allowed to discriminate against the federal government,185 except in exceptional 
circumstances.)186 
The point has a practical dimension as well as raising questions of federalism. 
The federal government for these purposes considers litigation “final” when the 
district judge has entered a final judgment in a trial, even if that judgment is the 
subject of appeal.187 Some states, by contrast, do not consider their judgments final 
for res judicata purposes until the judgment has been considered by the highest 
available state court, or until the time for appeal has lapsed. Obviously these state 
rules regarding finality have not been adopted with a race to judgment in mind; 
they are requiring for themselves a marathon, when their federal opponent must run 
only half the distance. The finality rules become even more bizarre when courts 
start applying them to issues that are finally litigated as distinct from final 
judgments. 
These, then, are the rules concerning which decision controls (in somewhat 
focused and oversimplified form): whichever tribunal finishes first may control the 
case, and each system can decide for itself at which point its cases shall be final for 
res judicata purposes, state and federal.188 
A. Current Law: Allowing and Even Encouraging Duplication 
But there is another important trick, one that surfaced in 1986 in Parsons Steel, 
Inc. v. First Alabama Bank.189 That case tells us that even if the federal proceeding 
finishes first, the successful litigant cannot obtain a federal injunction against a 
duplicative state proceeding if the state court has already ruled that res judicata 
does not apply.190 If the state court has ruled on the issue of whether the federal 
judgment is controlling, the state court’s ruling of finality is itself res judicata, and 
its correctness or incorrectness must be questioned, if at all, by appealing within the 
state court system. The only possibility for federal input into the decision will then 
be a grant of certiorari by the U.S. Supreme Court. A losing party can request 
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review if the case ends up turning on a federal question (like the failure to respect 
the prior federal judgment). Review might well be granted. Conflicting state and 
federal judgments pertaining to the same matter would be likely to attract the 
Court’s attention. It obviously would be unusual for state courts to persist to this 
stage, in the face of a controlling federal decision. 
The Parsons holding was surprising because the Anti-Injunction Act,191 which 
forbids federal courts from enjoining ongoing state proceedings, contains three 
exceptions, one of which (“to protect or effectuate its judgments”) the Court has 
interpreted to apply only to a federal court’s ability to enjoin a state proceeding 
when a federal proceeding is final and entitled to res judicata effect.192 (Another 
one allows injunctions against continuation of a state proceeding that has been 
removed to federal court.)193 Despite falling within the clear exception, Parsons did 
not allow a federal court to issue an injunction to protect and enforce its final 
federal judgment.194 
Consequently, Parsons teaches us that litigants who like the result of a race won 
in federal court should go immediately to the federal court to enjoin an ongoing 
state proceeding, before asking the state court to halt. Once announced, this rule 
may prove easy to follow, but before it was announced, litigants might reasonably 
have assumed that basic politeness required asking the state judge to halt his case 
before bringing an injunctive proceeding against him. 
Of course the state court in such a situation might rule that res judicata required 
it to stop. Practicality should require that ruling, unless the object is to harass the 
party who won in the already-final litigation. Presumably in the end, even if the 
resolution has to take place at the Supreme Court level, a prior federal court 
judgment that was entitled to finality under current law would make the state 
proceeding irrelevant. 
If, instead, the state court has continued its litigation, at least three possible 
explanations exist: (1) the state court’s defiance of the rules, probably out of 
sympathy for the party who lost in federal court; (2) the state court’s misapplication 
of the same res judicata rules that the federal court is applying (assuming that the 
federal court is applying them correctly—an additional possibility is that the state 
court has it right and the federal court has it wrong); (3) the state court’s application 
of different rules of res judicata than the federal court is applying. The last two 
possibilities remind us that in federal court jurisprudence it is always important to 
separate out two questions: which court should decide and which law should apply, 
and the answer to one can easily differ from the other. After all, as we saw in Part 
III, the aim is to have the same law apply, at least to “substantive” matters, 
wherever a particular controversy is litigated. 
The set of rules about which law applies might not help at all because of not 
knowing whether to treat res judicata rules as substantive or procedural. Probably 
they are procedural by mainstream definition. Surely they also are outcome 
determinative.195 
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Federal statutory rules can apply in state courts even if “procedural,” but the 
federal res judicata rules that exist are not codified; they are common law rules 
developed by courts over time. They are similar in substance to the rules some 
states have adopted, but other states’ res judicata rules vary. Common variations, in 
addition to the time of finality, concern which claims must be brought together in a 
single litigation (some states allow much more splitting of lawsuits than the federal 
system and some other states do), and whether or not “mutuality” is required in 
order for a party to be bound by an issue she fully litigated in another proceeding. 
The issue concerning mutuality is: can the prior outcome be used against a 
defendant if she lost, even by a plaintiff who was not a party and thus would not 
have been bound by the outcome if she had won? The federal system and some 
states answer this question in the affirmative; they do not require mutuality for res 
judicata to operate.196 Other states would answer no, that a party who could not be 
bound by a prior judgment cannot use that judgment to bind another. These and 
other doctrinal differences in various laws of res judicata can lead to directly 
opposite outcomes, both between states and in the federal-state context, depending 
upon whether a state’s law governs the issue or the federal court’s res judicata law 
does. 
One additional complication therefore is to determine which law applies, if there 
is to be any difference between the law applied and the forum applying it. That is, 
this would not be an issue if the conclusion were simply that because the issue is 
procedural and there is no codified federal rule, a state court can apply its law on 
this issue and a federal court can apply its law. If this were the case, then by finding 
a court with jurisdiction, we would find the correct law to apply (and uniformity 
would suffer). That approach, unlike the Supreme Court’s resolution of this issue in 
Semtek, would have federal res judicata rules govern the effect of federal diversity 
suits as well as federal question suits, when the suits within federal court 
jurisdiction were the first final ones. Federal res judicata would control the effect of 
the first suit whether the subsequent suit was in state or federal court. (Therefore 
the effect of a judgment, after it was rendered, could not be changed by changing 
the federal-state forum.)197 Suits decided by state courts similarly would be 
governed by their state’s rules of res judicata, unless and until Congress enacted 
legislation to the contrary. Since our country began, Congress has in fact had 
legislation that has been interpreted to support the current approach; to require that 
each state’s rules of res judicata control the effect of its own judgments in 
subsequent litigation in federal court and in other state courts.198 
In Semtek the Supreme Court adopted a different approach. Instead of holding 
that res judicata was a procedural matter to be left to the rules of the initial forum, 
Justice Scalia, writing for a unanimous Court, ruled that federal diversity cases 
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should be governed by state res judicata rules.199 Scalia claimed that it was already 
established that federal law defined the effect of federal judgments (even though 
Congress has not acted, so that judge-made “federal common law” controls) when 
the judgments lay within the courts’ federal question jurisdiction.200 
Scalia confuses the analysis somewhat by insisting on describing the Court’s 
decision to use state res judicata rules for diversity cases as an exercise of “federal 
common law,” on the ground that the Court had power to and could have created 
federal rules but chose not to.201 It is the use of that term that is unusual, arguably 
inappropriate, and surely confusing. Usually, even when federal courts’ ability to 
choose the governing rule may be recognized because of strong federal interests 
potentially involved, if the choice is made to have state rules govern instead, those 
rules are not described as federal common law.202 Instead, they may be called 
“federally incorporated state law,” or “state law operating by federal choice,” or 
“state law that does not operate of its own force.” “Federal common law” is more 
appropriately used to describe the law made when the court does choose the federal 
alternative and sets about creating a federal law that will control nationwide.203 
More important than this needless confusion in terminology is the essential 
holding attributed to Semtek—that state res judicata rules govern the res judicata 
effect of federal diversity decisions. Superficially that appears correct; after all, 
there is usually greater state interest than federal in the law applied in diversity 
cases, and federal question cases are more likely to involve federal law than are 
diversity cases. But when one considers the interaction between res judicata rules 
and the forum’s rules on what to plead and join, it seems clear that the forum 
should govern many issues of res judicata that appear in diversity cases as well.204 
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 The federal courts have traditionally adhered to the related doctrines of res 
judicata and collateral estoppel. Under res judicata, a final judgment on the 
merits of an action precludes the parties or their privies from relitigating issues 
that were or could have been raised in that action. Under collateral estoppel, 
once a court has decided an issue of fact or law necessary to its judgment, that 
decision may preclude relitigation of the issue in a suit on a different cause of 
action involving a party to the first case. 
449 U.S. 90, 94 (1980) (citation omitted). Justice Stewart then added in a footnote that “[t]he 
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The Court in Semtek had recognized that “federal reference to state law will not 
obtain . . . in situations in which the state law is incompatible with federal 
interests,”205 as is true in general in cases involving state law operating by federal 
choice,206 but insofar as Semtek is taken as a general rule pertaining to applying 
state res judicata principles in diversity cases, the general rule is questionable. 
In contradiction to an approach of applying state res judicata rules in diversity 
cases, the claim preclusion aspect of res judicata, for one example, should be 
determined by federal rules whenever a case is tried in federal court if the 
determinative issue is whether the claim should have been brought in the prior, first 
lawsuit. Because the federal court follows federal rules of procedure (and states 
follow state rules), it is federal law in diversity litigation that determines what 
claims should be joined or otherwise are considered waived. A common federal test 
requires all issues “with a common nucleus of operative facts” to be presented in 
the same federal lawsuit; if they are not included, they are forfeited and cannot be 
litigated at another time or in another court. To do so would be to disrespect the 
federal judgment and would allow the federal court to issue an injunction to enforce 
its judgment. 
There is a different problem with state res judicata for diversity cases when the 
issue is collateral estoppel, also referred to as issue preclusion. I doubt that the 
choice of the issue preclusive effect of a federal judgment should be made by topic 
of jurisdiction—federal question or diversity. Because it is the effect of a decided 
case that is at issue, an approach is available that is more sensible than sorting the 
cases according to the jurisdictional heading under which each case was filed. 
Decisions about issue preclusion can be made at the end of the litigation—at a time 
when it is fully apparent what the case was actually about—including whether it 
was more closely related to state or federal law, or which, if either, it turned upon.  
Perhaps instead of sorting cases by federal question or diversity jurisdiction, the 
trial judge at the conclusion of each case could declare a case either state or federal 
for issue preclusion purposes. That ruling would determine which jurisdiction’s 
collateral estoppel law controlled its effect. 
My general point is that deciding this issue according to its jurisdictional 
heading—federal question or diversity—creates a system that is neither simple nor 
rational. An initial critique might be that, as the concurrent jurisdiction examples 
above reveal, the actual jurisdictional heading can be happenstance. I do not want 
to make that argument though, because I do not regard that as much of a detriment. 
(Indeed, a happenstance system has the benefit that each of the systems will get 
some of the cases; that sounds like concurrent jurisdiction to me.) But the example 
I am going to give now is meant to go one step further—to be your worst 
nightmare—assuming of course that you dream about this stuff and do not value 
chaos and irrationality in your civil procedure system. 
                                                                                                                 
Restatement of Judgments now speaks of res judicata as ‘claim preclusion’ and collateral 
estoppel as ‘issue preclusion.’ Some courts and commentators use ‘res judicata’ as generally 
meaning both forms of preclusion.” Id. at 94 n.5 (citation omitted). Our discussion uses the 
term “res judicata” in this latter, broadest sense. 
 205. Semtek, 531 U.S. at 509. 
 206. See De Sylva, 351 U.S. 570; Reconstruction Fin. Corp. v. Beaver, 328 U.S. 204 
(1946). 
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A plaintiff can actually set up a case so that state law will be dispositive in 
federal court and vice versa: 
Lennon B. has copyrighted a song “Visualize” and licensed Paul B. to 
perform it, with his group, at its debut performance at Central Park. The 
song is a great hit. Lennon claims that Paul has continued to perform it, 
without seeking permission from, or paying any royalties to, Lennon. 
Lennon hires his brother, a well-known state court litigator, to handle 
his claim. He sues Paul B in the New York state courts for breaching 
his contract by using and performing the song generally, rather than for 
the limited use for which it was licensed. 
28 U.S.C. § 1388 gives exclusive jurisdiction to the federal district courts of 
claims “arising under” the Copyright Act. Lennon, however, has sued in contract, a 
subject over which state, not federal courts, have jurisdiction.207 Federal courts 
could not hear a contract claim unless the parties were of diverse citizenship and 
the amount in controversy was at least $75,000.208 
If Lennon had wanted to use federal courts rather than state courts, he could 
have sued Paul in federal court for infringing his copyright, alleging that each and 
all of the uses other than the authorized one constituted an infringement. Under 
established interpretation, infringement is indeed the only major federal cause of 
action under the copyright laws.209 When the Supreme Court initially decided that 
issue, even infringement was implied and not explicit, and rights to sue in other 
forms could equally well have been inferred as necessary or useful remedies to 
enforce the federal statute. In any event, with infringement as his cause of action, 
Lennon is properly in federal court. In fact, he could not proceed in state court with 
a suit so crafted, because § 1338 gives exclusive jurisdiction to federal courts of 
suits “arising under” the Copyright Act, as infringement suits undoubtedly do. 
Each suit therefore—the state contract action and the federal infringement 
action—is proper in the forum in which it sits and could not be brought or 
transferred to the other under current law. At the same time, the two suits are 
substantially duplicative. 
Nor does the form in which the suits are brought say anything about what issues 
will be important or controlling. In the first place, at the outset of the case (when 
only the complaint has been filed) there is no way to know whether the 
determinative issue is really legal or factual. Moreover, until the issues are joined, 
there is no way to know what the dispute is about; usually one cannot know 
whether the claims have even prima facie merit. 
But a suit filed as a state contract action certainly can end up deciding federal 
law and doing so in a way that the only available federal judicial input lies in the 
Supreme Court of the United States. It can do that even with respect to matters that 
Congress has deliberately placed within the exclusive federal jurisdiction, 
                                                                                                                 
 
 207. Contract claims are “a state cause of action”; copyright infringement claims are “a 
federal cause of action.” See T.B. Harms Co. v. Eliscu, 339 F.2d 823 (2d Cir. 1964). 
 208. 28 U.S.C. § 1332 (2006). 
 209. See T.B. Harms, 339 F.2d 823. 
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presumably in pursuit of the greater uniformity or expertise that Congress expected 
federal courts to bring to the field. To pursue the hypothetical case above: 
In Lennon’s NY state contract action, Paul B. answers that Lennon’s 
copyright is invalid because the work was already in the public domain. 
Lennon in reply defends his copyright. 
The state court judge will decide whether the particular federal copyright is 
valid, despite Congress’s grant of exclusive jurisdiction to the federal courts in § 
1338. A state judge may therefore hold the copyright invalid, subject only to 
Supreme Court review. If a particular judgment is heavily based on facts and does 
not seem to have broad relevance beyond the particular case, Supreme Court 
review may not be likely. 
Similarly, Lennon’s infringement action, brought because he chose federal 
court, could turn out to revolve upon factual niceties; or it could revolve around 
niceties of state law and have little or nothing to do with copyright or any other 
federal law. One example: 
Lennon sues for infringement. Paul answers that the proper 
interpretation of the contract is that he was permitted use for a year and 
not just for one performance. The fact finder, whether federal judge or 
jury, is called upon to decide the dispute about the meaning of the 
contract, although that state law issue has little relation to federal law or 
policy. 
I imagine that the point has been adequately made that the jurisdictional heading 
does not always have much relation to what happens in a lawsuit. This suggests, 
contrary to Semtek, that federal collateral estoppel (regardless of which court was 
applying that law) should apply to a contract suit within the federal diversity 
jurisdiction that has held a copyright invalid—or that, as a principal holding, has 
upheld a disputed federal copyright for that matter. Moreover, to any extent that 
state collateral estoppel rules do ever govern federal diversity suits, as Semtek 
suggests they should, they also should logically govern federal infringement suits 
that have ended up turning on state contract law. 
If state collateral estoppel rules are ever to govern the effect of diversity 
litigation, the safe course for a litigant during the initial suit would be to assume the 
applicability of the broadest form of collateral estoppel, whether that is state or 
federal. This strategy would be the self-protective one for the litigant who does not 
wish to be surprised by a ruling of preclusion because the final word on which law 
applied would not come until the end of the litigation. When state and federal rules 
differ, the federal rule concerning relitigation is likely to be the stricter.210 
                                                                                                                 
 
 210. Current (and long-standing) interpretation of the “full faith and credit” statute, 28 
U.S.C. § 1738, does not allow the approach of applying federal res judicata law to state court 
rulings on essentially federal issues. (This is a matter for another day, but I do believe that 
this long-standing interpretation is demonstrably erroneous, because § 1738 was intended to 
apply only to cases within the diversity jurisdiction. There was no general federal question at 
the time of the original full faith and credit provision—the predecessor of the not-much-
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A different possibility would segregate issues to be controlled by state law from 
those controlled by federal law, in order to treat those differently. It may sometimes 
be unduly complicated to have a system in which state and federal issues have 
different preclusive effects, even though appearing in the same case. But Semtek 
suggests that approach may be desirable because federal res judicata rules in fact 
seem appropriate for some issues in a case and not others. The rule that Scalia 
adopts in Semtek, for example, is perfect for the type of issue that was 
determinative in that case, even if the rule cannot properly be generalized to all res 
judicata issues and all federal diversity litigation. 
In Semtek, the question was the effect of an expired state statute of limitations, 
applied by a federal court in a diversity case to dismiss the suit, on the ability of the 
plaintiff to commence the suit anew in another state with jurisdiction whose statute 
of limitations had not expired. Would the second suit be inconsistent with the 
federal court’s application of the state statute in the first suit? 
The policy behind the statute of limitations applied in the first suit is clearly 
central to the inquiry. The relevant state was California. States can have different 
reasons for adopting statutes of limitation. The dominant intent might be to give 
repose to possible defendants after a certain number of years, in which case the 
state policy would counsel that no further litigation was consistent with application 
of its statute. But the intent might also be more of an administrative one, not 
wanting to trouble California courts with stale claims. If this is the intent, it is not 
inconsistent for another interested jurisdiction to consider the case on the merits. 
Scalia was correct then in looking to California policy rather than some federal 
procedural rule in deciding whether the second suit could continue. This suggests 
that courts, where practicable, should look issue by issue when the question is res 
judicata and in effect apply a federal common law of interest analysis in 
determining whether state or federal law applies to particular res judicata problems. 
In effect, the court making the decision whether a second suit can proceed must 
examine what aspect of the prior judgment might be disrespected if the second 
proceeding went forward. If the second proceeding might not give appropriate 
effect to state policy and the state laws that were applied, then state law is likely to 
be determinative; if it might negate the federal procedures or other federal rules that 
applied in the diversity case, federal res judicata is likely to control. The general 
inquiry may over time result in clear subrules, such as the suggestion that the 
forum’s rules should govern when joinder of parties or claims is the question and 
that state’s rules should govern when the issue is the effect of federal court 
dismissal under the state’s statute of limitations. 
In short, the basic rule for concurrent, in personam jurisdiction is that state and 
federal lawsuits, though duplicative, can both continue. Indeed, the federal suit 
should continue (at least according to language in Colorado River). Whether the 
                                                                                                                 
changed rule that persists today. That statute’s approach makes perfect sense with respect to 
the diversity jurisdiction—or, we should instead say today, for cases that have turned upon 
state law—for the same reasons favoring Scalia’s approach in Semtek. But federal laws have 
their own policies about the circumstances in which they apply and the effects they should be 
given and how those considerations should weigh in against other applicable policies.) The 
Court’s approach leaves room for incorporating exceptions, but it should be basic, for the 
reasons that Scalia gives in Semtek, that it is part of a federal enactment and of federal policy 
whether lawsuits to enforce the enactment are subject to revision by later-brought actions. 
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state court favors continuing, and in what circumstances, is a matter of state law. If 
duplicative suits occur, which result in the end controls depends upon a race to 
judgment in which state and federal standards intertwine to define rules for the race 
and how and where the winner’s judgment will be enforced. But the essential rule 
is that duplication continues and the first to finish wins. 
This is self-evidently an entirely crazy system, and it is hard to believe that it 
really exists. In a day of scarce resources, to have two ongoing suits only one of 
which can matter, in a system that could hardly be thought to respect the dignity of 
anyone, let alone the state and federal courts, it seems this cannot be. Nonetheless, 
the reality is that concurrent lawsuits are no rare phenomenon, as one can see even 
in Supreme Court litigation.211 
Why would a litigant want to pursue duplicative litigation? A defendant’s 
fervent desire to be in another court than the one the plaintiff has already chosen 
may sometimes be the answer, but the time and expense that will be involved 
would deter most from bringing their own, separate duplicative suit. Occasionally a 
party may deliberately double the costs of litigation, for himself and the other party, 
because of the ability to outspend and thus destroy the opposition. That tactic, 
which amounts to harassment, can be used either by a defendant or by a plaintiff 
who brings duplicative actions in state and federal court. 
Duplicative litigation is so inefficient and the reasons for pursuing it sufficiently 
dubious that one would not expect the Supreme Court to promote duplication. But 
in some ways the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence since Colorado River has done 
just that, although Chief Justice Rehnquist fought hard for a retreat and his position 
may still prevail. 
The Supreme Court’s 1976 Colorado River doctrine, described above, seemed 
to encourage duplication. Colorado River was confusing because the Court clearly 
articulated a rule disapproving of abstention “just” to avoid duplicative litigation 
but also found that very particularized circumstances justified abstaining in that 
specific case.212 Unless the Colorado River facts are deemed to be exceptionally 
compelling, the result in Colorado River is inconsistent with most of the reasoning, 
making it difficult to ascertain whether it really is impermissible to abstain only to 
avoid the costs of duplication. The arguable tension between language and result 
make murky when abstaining just to avoid the usual costs of duplication is 
illegitimate. 
Not only is the opinion confusing, but also in a series of opinions the Justices 
have continued to differ markedly in their enthusiasm for Colorado River’s 
holding; they continue to disagree fundamentally about whether federal courts 
should have discretion to abstain in favor of pending, or even later-filed, state civil 
proceedings.213 
                                                                                                                 
 
 211. See, e.g., Parsons Steel, Inc. v. First Ala. Bank, 474 U.S. 518 (1986); Atl. Coast Line 
R.R. v. Bhd. of Locomotive Eng’rs, 398 U.S. 281 (1970); Kaiser Steel Corp. v. W. S. Ranch 
Co., 391 U.S. 593 (1968); Amalgamated Clothing Workers v. Richman Bros., 348 U.S. 511 
(1955). 
 212. Colo. River Water Conservation Dist. v. United States, 424 U.S. 800 (1976). 
 213. The same issues exist in state criminal proceedings or state civil enforcement 
proceedings that are concurrent with federal cases considering some of the same issues. For 
those cases, the Court has adopted a rule deferring to those state proceedings, see Hicks ex 
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Will v. Calvert Fire Insurance Co.214 rejected duplicative litigation, even at the 
cost of denying federal court to a suit brought under a federal statute granting 
exclusive federal jurisdiction. The district judge granted a motion to stay an action 
involving claims under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 while substantially 
identical claims were being litigated in state court, but the federal plaintiff obtained 
a writ of mandamus ordering the district judge to proceed.215 In an opinion by 
Justice Rehnquist, the Supreme Court reversed.216 Rehnquist distinguished 
Colorado River’s “virtually unflagging obligation” language on the grounds that 
the district court there had dismissed the case outright, whereas here, the court had 
granted a stay, which was open to reconsideration if circumstances changed.217 If 
that distinction were sufficient to avoid any non-abstention policy of Colorado 
River and courts routinely stayed duplicative federal proceedings, the Colorado 
River doctrine would have very limited effect. Rehnquist noted as well that 
mandamus was an extreme remedy, available only where the litigant’s right was 
“clear and indisputable,” which he found not to be the case here.218 
Justice Brennan, the author of Colorado River, dissented. He distinguished 
Colorado River’s result by focusing on the exclusive federal jurisdiction that 
federal statutes granted over one of the claims in Will.219 Brennan considered that 
grant of jurisdiction as evidence of a policy favoring federal adjudication of 
securities claims, which distinguished it from the McCarran Act at issue in 
Colorado River, which encouraged unitary state adjudication of water rights.220 
The tension between a rule that federal courts must (usually) continue and one 
that judicial discretion prevails persisted, at least until Justice O’Connor’s 
unanimous opinion221 in Wilton v. Seven Falls Co.222 Wilton held that Colorado 
River had no impact on declaratory judgment actions, which were still governed by 
a discretionary standard enunciated many years earlier in Brillhart v. Excess 
Insurance Co.223 Declaratory judgment actions proceed only at the discretion of the 
judge.224 Declaratory judgment cases then, if duplicative, could be disposed of in 
accordance with Rehnquist’s approach, despite any suggestion of Colorado River 
to the contrary.225 
                                                                                                                 
rel. Feiock v. Feiock, 485 U.S. 624 (1988); Samuels v. Mackell, 401 U.S. 66 (1971); 
Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971), that is not appropriate in the usual civil setting, New 
Orleans Public Service, Inc. v. Council of the City of New Orleans, 491 U.S. 350(1989). For 
criticism of this set of rules, even as applied to federal suits that might interfere with state 
criminal proceedings, see Martha A. Field, The Uncertain Nature of Federal Jurisdiction, 22 
WM & MARY L REV. 683, 701–20 (1981). 
 214. 437 U.S. 655, 659 (1978). 
 215. Id. at 657–60. 
 216. Id. at 667. 
 217. Id. at 664–65. 
 218. Id. at 666. 
 219. Id. at 673 (Brennan, J., dissenting). 
 220. Id. 
 221. The vote was 8–0, with Justice Breyer not participating. 
 222. 515 U.S. 277 (1995). 
 223. Id. at 286–87 (citing Brillhart v. Excess Ins. Co., 316 U.S. 491 (1942)). 
 224. The Wilton Court pointed to the Declaratory Judgment Act’s “textual commitment 
to discretion.” Id. at 286. 
 225. See Will, 437 U.S. at 665 (dictum) (“[A] busy federal trial judge . . . is . . . entrusted 
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Accordingly, the much-debated and important issue may have been resolved, for 
the moment at least, in favor of the Colorado River approach of very limited 
discretion as the usual rule for injunctive proceedings but not for declaratory ones.  
The problem with such a resolution is first, that it is unclear how to apply it, and 
second, that some possible applications make very little sense. The ambiguity arises 
because parties usually can and often do ask for injunctive and declaratory relief 
simultaneously. Does this remove or allow judicial discretion to decline 
jurisdiction? If by simply joining a request for declaratory relief to an injunctive 
action, one could avoid the Colorado River presumption that the federal court 
proceed, then the Colorado River rule would be readily avoidable. Moreover, the 
result would be irrational and arguably unfair, in placing this aspect of the right to 
federal jurisdiction in total control of the plaintiff, who has the choice of which 
form of relief to seek. 
Only the Ninth Circuit has interpreted Wilton in this way that so largely negates 
Colorado River. That court held that Colorado River applies only in cases in which 
the nondeclaratory claim is “independent of the request for declaratory relief.”226 If 
a request for declaratory relief overlaps with a request for an injunction, full 
judicial discretion trumps any presumption Colorado River created. 
Most circuits, however, have adopted the opposite approach. Some say that 
Colorado River’s standard of obligation to decide applies, regardless of the 
presence of a declaratory judgment, in any case that includes a nonfrivolous claim 
for damages, injunction, or other nondeclaratory relief.227 In those cases, even the 
declaratory judgment itself will proceed in federal court. As the Fourth Circuit said 
in Chase Brexton Health Services, Inc. v. Maryland Department of Health & 
Mental Hygiene,228 “when a plaintiff seeks relief in addition to a declaratory 
judgment, such as damages or injunctive relief, both of which a court must address, 
then the entire benefit derived from exercising discretion not to grant declaratory 
relief is frustrated, and a stay would not save any judicial resources.”229 Chase 
Brexton was a § 1983 action230 for injunctive and declaratory relief, and the court 
held that the Colorado River standard of obligation to hear the case governed the 
entire action, because the claims were “so closely intertwined” that the court could 
not decide one without the other.231 Presumably, if a declaratory judgment claim is 
separate and independent, it could be stayed while other claims proceeded; perhaps 
full judicial discretion applies to such declaratory actions. 
Often cases allowing Wilton discretion have been actions in which only 
declaratory relief was requested or appropriate, and that factor should limit the 
Wilton rule. It appears that simply choosing declaratory relief when injunctive or 
monetary relief could also be available will not cut short federal courts’ obligation 
to hear the case. It is primarily in cases in which the declaratory plaintiff could not 
                                                                                                                 
with wide latitude in setting his own calendar.”). 
 226. United Nat’l Ins. Co. v. R&D Latex Corp., 242 F.3d 1102, 1114 (9th Cir. 2001). 
 227. See, e.g., Kelly Inv., Inc. v. Cont’l Common Corp., 315 F.3d 494, 497 n.4 (5th Cir. 
2002) (damages); Vill. of Westfield v. Welch’s, 170 F.3d 116, 124 n.5 (2d Cir. 1999) 
(damages). 
 228. 411 F.3d 457 (4th Cir. 2005). 
 229. Id. at 466. 
 230. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2006). 
 231. Chase Brexton, 411 F.3d at 466–67.  
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have brought a coercive suit that courts have found the Wilton discretion to be 
relevant. A frequent example is an action by an insurance company seeking a 
declaration that it has no duty to defend or indemnify an insured.232 One appellate 
court also applied Brillhart and Wilton in an interpleader action.233 If confined to 
cases in which only declaratory relief can be sought, the category of cases governed 
by Wilton is much reduced. 
It is a fair reading of the law at this time that Colorado River’s encouragement 
of duplicative litigation remains the rule, except in cases in which only declaratory 
relief is sought.234 Today, a district court judge following the rules should fulfill her 
“virtually unflagging obligation” to exercise jurisdiction in all but purely 
declaratory cases, without regard to the cost of duplicating an already commenced 
state proceeding. 
This is our current complex of rules concerning concurrent, in personam 
jurisdiction. Simplification is obviously desirable. In a race to judgment system, 
such as we now have, we also need a sensible formula for which result should 
control. But more boldly, one might ask whether a race to judgment system makes 
sense at all. I believe that the legitimacy of duplicative litigation should be 
narrowed or eliminated. Not only is it wasteful but also the reasons for initiating 
duplicative litigation often seem illegitimate, so it is difficult to be sympathetic to 
hearing the later-filed suit. One way to avoid duplication in many cases is by 
                                                                                                                 
 
 232. See, e.g., Scottsdale Ins. Co. v. Detco Indus., Inc., 426 F.3d 994 (8th Cir. 2005) 
(insurance); Verizon Commc’ns, Inc. v. Inverizon Int’l, Inc., 295 F.3d 870 (8th Cir. 2002) 
(trademark); State Auto Ins. Cos. v. Summy, 234 F.3d 131 (3d Cir. 2001) (insurance); 
Capitol Indem. Corp. v. Haverfield, 218 F.3d 872 (8th Cir. 2000) (insurance); Agora 
Syndicate, Inc. v. Robinson Janitorial Specialists, Inc., 149 F.3d 371 (5th Cir. 1998) 
(insurance); Nat’l Union Fire Ins. Co. v. Karp, 108 F.3d 17 (2d Cir. 1997) (insurance); 
Exxon Corp. v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 129 F.3d 781 (5th Cir. 1997) (insurance); 
Youell v. Exxon Corp., 74 F.3d 373 (2d Cir. 1996) (insurance); Centennial Life Ins. Co. v. 
Poston, 88 F.3d 255 (4th Cir. 1996) (insurance company’s suit for declaration that policy 
was void). 
 233. See NYLife Distribs., Inc. v. Adherence Grp., Inc., 72 F.3d 371 (3d Cir. 1995) (2–
1), reh’g denied (1996). But see W. Side Transp., Inc. v. APAC Miss., Inc., 237 F. Supp. 2d 
707 (S.D. Miss. 2002) (holding that Colorado River, rather than Wilton, applies in an 
interpleader action where claims for injunctive relief are also present). 
 234. Is it the practice as well? Lower court judges’ discrete use of avoidance techniques 
prevents the courts from having to hear some duplicative suits. Partly because if they are 
apprised of the pending litigation and if there is no unusual reason making the later forum 
the more appropriate one, judges’ inclination would usually be to avoid duplicative litigation 
where possible. Many would just dismiss the later-filed litigation because that is sensible; 
without a challenge on appeal, that would be the end of it. State rules vary, as discussed, but 
some at least would defer to avoid duplication or allow the state judge the discretion to do 
so. In federal court, even if the Colorado River principle against abstaining to avoid 
duplication were argued, the judge could invoke an exception. (More than the order of filing 
is usually required to avoid the wastefulness of needless duplication.) Or a district court 
judge may invoke an inapplicable but suitably amorphous abstention doctrine as a reason not 
to proceed, when the real reason is to avoid duplication. See Kaiser Steel Corp. v. W.S. 
Ranch Co., 391 U.S. 593 (1968). Many cases of duplication may thus be avoided, although 
not always with the doctrinal purity one might desire. But many also continue, and Colorado 
River encourages them to do so. 
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making the same changes in the removal rules, in diversity and federal question 
cases, as have been advocated in Parts II and III. 
B. How Removal Can Help 
The issue of duplicative federal-state litigation is important, both in theory and 
in practice, and our current resolution is overcomplicated, inefficient, and not 
conducive to producing justice. How would this system be affected by reforming 
removal so that resident defendants also could remove in diversity suits, and so that 
in federal question cases, either party could opt for federal court on the basis of a 
federal cause of action or because the case otherwise appeared to turn on federal 
law, based not only upon the complaint but also upon the defendant’s answer and 
the plaintiff’s reply? Those are the essential removal reforms here proposed for 
diversity and federal question jurisdictions. 
Seemingly, the amended removal procedures would resolve the problem, 
allowing defendants as well as plaintiffs to participate in the choice between federal 
and state jurisdiction. The proposed removal reforms would cure the problem, 
because a case brought in state court that could also be brought in federal court, by 
plaintiff or defendant on the basis of all of the jurisdictional papers eventually filed, 
could be removed from state to federal court. Thus a suit could end up in federal 
court, at the choice of either party, regardless of where the suit began. So the 
duplicative suits could be consolidated into one. An additional advantage would be 
a possible reduction in litigation, as the advantage currently arising from being the 
first to sue would be removed.235 
The consolidated suit that would replace the repetitive ones would be a federal 
suit. With respect to removal, federal law could temper the national intrusion, 
preferably in the new removal statute itself. One approach would be to set strict 
limits upon removal—for example a requirement that removal be requested 
promptly after the possibility for federal jurisdiction has become known—fairly 
soon after it becomes apparent that the case would/could/might turn on federal law, 
for example. A timely and disciplined intervention of federal power, made at the 
initiation of litigation and before too much cost and effort has been invested in the 
state proceeding, may be far less abrasive and obnoxious to the state system than 
the kind of preempting the judgment by winning the race that can occur currently. 
Of course another possible replacement for a race to judgment system is a race 
to the courthouse system, a system scholars call lis pendens. Under that approach, 
the first suit to commence is the one to continue. That system, like the removal 
reforms, would have to be put in place by Congress, so that both the state and 
federal systems would comply. It would be far more efficient than our current 
approach, because there would be only one trial. It also would have the advantage 
over the proposed removal reforms of having some of the affected cases end up in 
                                                                                                                 
 
 235. This is one advantage of the proposed system over a lis pendens system, which 
would have the forum chosen by the first to sue. In many ways, that system also could lead 
to greater efficiency than we now have. Like the removal reforms that are proposed, such a 
system could be brought about only through congressional enactment. 
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state court and some in federal court, instead of all having the option to go to 
federal court as with the proposed approach. 
In other ways, however, changing removal rules is a better reform. It allows 
more prelitigation certainty, because either party has the option of invoking federal 
jurisdiction so both can count on a federal (but not a state) rule applying. It 
discourages forum shopping and eliminates unfairness between the parties, in 
exactly the sense that Brandeis found so objectionable in Erie. It also is less likely 
to provoke or accelerate litigation than a first-to-file rule would do. 
These advantages make removal reform a better approach than lis pendens for 
our federal-state system. But there will always be some cases that escape the 
removal reforms, for example a case brought in state court with incomplete 
diversity that substantially duplicates a case in the federal diversity jurisdiction. 
Congress should legislate lis pendens, or a race to the courthouse approach, for 
federal-state duplicative litigation that could not be removed even under the 
proposed removal reforms. 
CONCLUSION 
The proposed removal changes will not only simplify federal-state procedural 
law; they will also be more efficient, rational, and just than the rules that currently 
prevail. The reform will allow federal question jurisdiction to fulfill its original 
purpose of allowing into federal court cases that turn on federal law. It will take a 
giant step toward enabling Brandeis’s vision of fairness between plaintiff and 
defendant, as articulated in Erie; and concurrent, duplicative state-federal litigation, 
with its tangled web of jurisdictional rules, can become an anachronism, replaced 
by one lawsuit, a federal one, unless both parties prefer a state court that the 
plaintiff has chosen. 
 
  
